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The Transmission of Domestic 
Shocks in Open Economies
Christopher Erceg, Christopher Gust, and 
David López-  Salido
2.1    Introduction
With the rapid expansion in world trade during the past two decades, 
policymakers have become increasingly interested in the consequences of 
greater trade openness for macroeconomic behavior. Considerable attention 
has focused on how external shocks may play a more prominent role in driv-
ing domestic ﬂ  uctuations as trade linkages grow, and as developing countries 
such as China exert a progressively larger inﬂ  uence on global energy and 
commodity prices. Our chapter examines a diﬀerent aspect of globaliza-
tion that has received less scrutiny in the recent literature. In particular, we 
investigate whether changes in trade openness are likely to have a substantial 
impact on the transmission of domestic shocks.
Economists have long recognized that openness could potentially aﬀect 
the responses of real activity to domestic shocks, including to monetary and 
ﬁ  scal policy. The Mundell (1962) and Fleming (1962) framework showed 
that ﬁ  scal shocks could have dramatically diﬀerent eﬀects depending on 
whether an economy was open or closed: in contrast to the stimulative eﬀect 
of a government spending rise on output in a closed economy, the same 
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shock had no eﬀect on output in an open economy, as real exchange rate 
appreciation crowded out real net exports.
A long- standing literature has also assessed the implications of openness 
for the eﬀects of domestic shocks on inﬂ  ation. Perhaps most obviously, 
economists drew attention to the potential divergence between domestic 
prices and consumer prices in an open economy, reﬂ  ecting the sensitivity 
of the latter to import prices. But important contributions in the 1970s 
and early 1980s also analyzed how the behavior of domestic price setting 
could be aﬀected by openness. Inﬂ  uential work by Dornbusch (1983) linked 
the desired markup in a monopolistic competition framework to the real 
exchange rate, and showed how the markup could be expected to decline 
in response to real exchange rate appreciation (reﬂ  ecting increased com-
petitive pressure from abroad). In an NBER conference volume a quarter 
century ago, Dornbusch and Fischer (1984) used this framework to argue 
that changes in the slope of the Phillips curve due to increased trade open-
ness were likely to have substantial implications for the transmission of 
monetary and ﬁ  scal policy. Speciﬁ  cally, these authors argued that monetary 
shocks were likely to cause domestic prices to respond more quickly due to 
an eﬀective steepening of the Phillips curve.
In this chapter, we use a two-  country dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) modeling framework to revisit the question of how changes 
in trade openness aﬀect the economy’s responses to monetary and ﬁ  scal 
shocks, as well as to a representative supply shock.1 Our analysis is heavily 
inﬂ  uenced by several important papers that compare the characteristics of 
optimal policy rules in closed and open economies by Clarida, Galí, and 
Gertler (2001, 2002), and Galí and Monacelli (2005).2 However, the main 
objective of these papers was to highlight conditions under which the policy 
problem in closed and open economies was formally similar: under such 
conditions, policy prescriptions from the closed economy carried over to 
the open economy with suitable changes in parameters. Our chapter diﬀers 
substantially insofar as its objective is to provide a quantitative assessment 
of the diﬀerences in the transmission channel as the trade openness of the 
economy varies.
We focus much of our analysis on a simple “workhorse” open economy 
model that extends Galí and Monacelli (2005) by incorporating nominal 
wage rigidities and additional shocks. Although our model allows for spill-
over eﬀects between the two countries, it can be approximated by a system of 
dynamic equations that parallels the closed economy model of Erceg, Hen-
1. Our approach follows the seminal work of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) and a large subse-
quent literature that incorporates nominal rigidities into microfounded open economy DSGE 
models. See Lane (2001) for a survey.
2. There is a burgeoning literature examining optimal monetary policy in an open economy 
setting. Some notable examples include Benigno and Benigno (2003), Corsetti and Pesenti 
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derson, and Levin (2000) in the special case in which the home country’s share 
of world output becomes arbitrarily small. As in the Erceg, Henderson, and 
Levin (2000) model, the presence of nominal wage rigidities confronts the 
policymaker with a trade- oﬀ between stabilizing inﬂ  ation and the output (or 
employment) gap. The parsimonious structure of our open economy model 
makes it easy to identify the economic channels through which openness 
aﬀects aggregate demand and supply, and hence the trade-  oﬀs confronting 
policymakers. In fact, the diﬀerences between the closed and open econo-
mies can be attributed to eﬀects on a single composite parameter that aﬀects 
the behavioral equations in the same way as the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution parameter ( ) in a closed economy model; that is, by aﬀecting 
the interest elasticity of aggregate demand and the wealth eﬀect on labor 
supply.3 Given that this parameter can be expressed as a weighted average 
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the trade price elasticity, 
where the weight on the latter varies directly with openness, it is straightfor-
ward to assess how changes in openness aﬀect equilibrium responses under 
a wide range of calibrations.
Our analysis shows that, in principle, there could be very pronounced 
divergence in the eﬀects of the domestic shocks on output and domestic 
inﬂ  ation as trade openness increases. In particular, with both a very high 
trade price elasticity and Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the enhanced abil-
ity to smooth consumption in the open economy markedly alters the wealth 
eﬀect of shocks on labor supply, and the slope of the household’s marginal 
rate of substitution (MRS) schedule (tending to ﬂ  atten it). These changes 
can have substantial eﬀects on aggregate supply, and through their eﬀect on 
marginal costs, on domestic inﬂ  ation and output. Moreover, on the aggre-
gate demand side, higher openness increases the eﬀective interest elasticity 
of the economy, provided that the trade price elasticity is higher than the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. In the extreme case 
in which the trade price elasticity becomes inﬁ  nitely high, our workhorse 
model in fact implies that government shocks have no eﬀect on output, 
inﬂ  ation, or interest rates.
However, under more empirically plausible values of the trade price elas-
ticity, aggregate supply is not very sensitive to trade openness. The interest 
sensitivity of aggregate demand, or “slope” of the new- Keynesian IS curve, 
exhibits somewhat more variation with openness, reﬂ  ecting that the trade 
price elasticity (of 1.5) is much higher than the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution of consumption under our benchmark calibration (so that put-
ting a larger weight on the former, as occurs with greater openness, increases 
the interest sensitivity of the economy). Overall, although openness does 
exert some eﬀect on the responses of domestic inﬂ  ation, output, and real 
3. This extends the results of Galí and Monacelli (2005), who also showed that the eﬀects of 
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interest rates to the inﬂ  ation target change, government spending, and tech-
nology shocks we consider, the size of the changes seems quite modest given 
the wide range of variation in the trade share examined (from 0 to 35 per-
cent). The main implications of openness are apparent in the composition of 
the expenditure response, with exports playing a larger role in a highly open 
economy, and in the wedge between consumer and domestic prices.
We then proceed to consider several variants of our workhorse model. 
First, we compare incomplete markets with the complete markets setting, 
and again conclude that openness exerts fairly small eﬀects unless the trade 
price elasticity and Frisch elasticity of labor supply are quite high. Second, 
we consider endogenous capital accumulation, and ﬁ  nd that the diﬀerences 
between closed and open economies are even smaller than in our workhorse 
model, reﬂ  ecting in part that endogenous capital boosts the interest rate 
elasticity of domestic demand. Third, we consider a speciﬁ  cation in which 
imports are used as intermediate goods; for reasonable calibrations of the 
import share, the results are very similar to the workhorse model. Fourth, 
we examine the implications of a framework that allows for both local cur-
rency pricing (as in Betts and Devereux [1996]; Devereux and Engel [2002]) 
and variable desired markups in the spirit of Dornbusch. We ﬁ  nd that these 
mechanisms can amplify diﬀerences in the response of domestic inﬂ  ation as 
the degree of openness varies. For example, domestic inﬂ  ation falls by less in 
response to a positive technology shock in a highly open economy, reﬂ  ecting 
that the associated exchange rate depreciation reduces the price competi-
tiveness of imports (which encourages domestic producers to boost their 
markups). However, large diﬀerences in trade openness appear required for 
these eﬀects to show through quantitatively.
A natural question is whether the alternative speciﬁ  cations suggested 
previously would aﬀect our conclusions if they were incorporated into our 
model jointly rather than in isolation. We address this question by exam-
ining the responses of the SIGMA model. This is a multicountry DSGE 
model used at the Federal Reserve Board for policy simulations, and is well-
 suited to address this question insofar as it includes many of the key features 
of the workhorse model and the variants, as well as various real rigidi-
ties designed to improve its empirical performance (e.g., adjustment costs 
on imports). We consider the responses of the SIGMA model to the same 
underlying shocks—including to the inﬂ  ation target, government spend-
ing, and technology—and essentially corroborate our main ﬁ  nding that the 
responses of domestic inﬂ  ation and output are not particularly sensitive 
to openness.
This chapter is organized as follows. We begin by presenting the simula-
tions of the SIGMA model in section 2.2. This approach proves helpful 
both as a way of highlighting our main results and for pointing out some 
restrictive features of the heuristic models discussed in the subsequent sec-
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of abstracting from capital accumulation in the workhorse model). Section 
2.3 describes the workhorse model, and then assesses how openness aﬀects 
the equilibrium under both ﬂ  exible and sticky prices. Section 2.4 considers 
several modiﬁ  cations of the workhorse model. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2      Theoretical and Empirical Motivation
In this section, we use a two- country version of the SIGMA model to illus-
trate how trade openness aﬀects the propagation of three diﬀerent domestic 
shocks, including a reduction in the central bank’s target inﬂ  ation rate, a rise 
in government spending, and a highly persistent rise in technology. In the 
case of the shock to the inﬂ  ation target, we compare the model’s implica-
tions to historical episodes of disinﬂ  ation that occurred in the United States, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom during the early 1980s and early 1990s. 
Readers who wish to skip ahead to sections 2.3 and 2.4—in which we fully 
describe a much simpler workhorse DSGE model and some variants to 
investigate the same questions—may do so without loss of continuity.
2.2.1    SIGMA  Simulations
The SIGMA incorporates an array of nominal and real rigidities to help 
the model yield plausible implications across a broad spectrum of domestic 
and international shocks.4 On the aggregate demand side, it allows for habit 
persistence in consumption, costs of changing the level of investment, and 
costs of adjusting trade ﬂ  ows.5 Final consumption and investment goods 
are produced using both domestically-  produced goods and imports. Inter-
national ﬁ  nancial markets are incomplete, so that households are restricted 
to borrowing or lending internationally through the medium of a nonstate 
contingent bond. On the supply side, prices are set in staggered Calvo-  style 
contracts in both the home and foreign market, with exporters setting their 
price in local currency terms, as in Betts and Devereux (1996) and Devereux 
and Engel (2002). The SIGMA embeds demand curves with nonconstant 
elasticities (NCES) that induce “strategic complementarity” in price setting 
(as in Kimball [1995]). In the spirit of Dornbusch (1983), this feature implies 
that the desired markup varies in response to real exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations, 
creating an incentive for ﬁ  rms to charge diﬀerent prices in home and foreign 
markets even under fully ﬂ  exible prices. As shown by Bergin and Feenstra 
(2001), Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson (2006), and Gust and Sheets (2006), it 
4. An inclusive description of SIGMA is provided by Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2006) for 
the case in which product demand is characterized by a Dixit-  Stiglitz CES aggregator, imply-
ing a constant desired markup. Gust and Sheets (2006) extend the model to allow for variable 
desired markups, as in the version used in this chapter, though they abstract from capital accu-
mulation and examine a smaller array of shocks.
5. Our speciﬁ  cation of habit persistence in consumption and adjustment costs on investment 
follows Smets and Wouters (2003).94        Christopher Erceg, Christopher Gust, and David López-Salido
can account for low exchange rate pass- through to import prices. Wages are 
also set in staggered Calvo-  style contracts.6
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor rule in which the nominal 
interest rate responds to the deviation of domestic inﬂ  ation from the central 
bank’s inﬂ  ation target and to the output gap. Although it is more realistic 
empirically to specify the monetary rule as responding to consumer price 
inﬂ  ation, such a speciﬁ  cation implicitly assigns a higher weight to import 
price inﬂ  ation as openness increases. This complicates the task of disentan-
gling the eﬀects of openness on transmission due to changes in the aggregate 
demand and supply blocks of the model—which is our main objective—from 
eﬀects due to a higher eﬀective weight on import price inﬂ  ation in the mon-
etary rule. Accordingly, we ﬁ  nd it very useful for heuristic purposes to simply 
condition on a rule that does not vary with openness, while still providing a 
reasonable characterization of policy in a relatively closed economy.7
Government purchases are exogenous, have no direct eﬀect on the util-
ity of households, and are ﬁ  nanced by lump-  sum taxes. Although SIGMA 
allows for some fraction of households to make “rule- of- thumb” consump-
tion decisions, we set this share to zero in what follows, so that there is 
eﬀectively a single representative household in each country.
Figure 2.1 shows the eﬀects of a 1 percentage point permanent reduction 
in the home country’s inﬂ  ation target under three diﬀerent calibrations of 
trade openness. The solid line shows the eﬀects under our benchmark cali-
bration based on U.S. data, so that the ratio of imports to gross domestic 
product (GDP) is 12 percent. The dashed line shows an alternative in which 
we lower the import share to 1 percent (labeled “nearly closed”), while the 
dotted line shows a second alternative in which the import share is 35 per-
cent (“high openness”), roughly consistent with the import to GDP ratio in 
highly open economies such Canada and the United Kingdom.8 The hori-
zontal axis shows quarters that have elapsed following the shock.
The eﬀects of the reduction in the inﬂ  ation target are qualitatively similar 
regardless of the degree of openness. The reduction in the inﬂ  ation target 
6. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), SIGMA incorporates dynamic 
indexation of both price and wage contracts, though the latter are indexed to past aggregate 
wage inﬂ  ation.
7. There are clearly many ways through which openness can aﬀect the transmission of domestic 
shocks through the monetary policy rule. Even within the class of rules responding to consumer 
price inﬂ  ation, the manner in which impulse responses to domestic shocks vary with openness can 
be quite sensitive to whether monetary policy responds to realized consumer price inﬂ  ation or to 
a forecast of inﬂ  ation. For example, a stimulative government spending shock typically causes ex 
post import price inﬂ  ation to fall (because the real exchange rate initially appreciates), but causes 
expected import price inﬂ  ation to rise. Although it remains interesting to explore some of these 
possibilities in future work, it is worth observing that the diﬀerence between consumer price inﬂ  a-
tion and domestic price inﬂ  ation shows much less variation with openness in SIGMA—which has 
features that account for low pass-  through of exchange rate changes to import prices—than in 
most open economy models that eﬀectively impose full pass- through within a couple of quarters.
8. In these experiments, we vary openness by changing the share parameter in the aggrega-
tors with a nonconstant elasticity of substitution (NCES) used to produce consumption and 
investment from the home and foreign goods.Fig. 2.1    Permanent reduction in the inﬂ  ation target in SIGMA (deviation from 
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requires policymakers to increase interest rates, causing output to contract 
and the real exchange rate (not shown) to appreciate. Private absorption falls in 
response to the higher interest rates, and exports also decline due to the induced 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Both domestic and consumer price 
inﬂ  ation fall, and roughly converge to their new target level after two years.
Perhaps somewhat remarkably, the responses of key macro aggregates—
including output, domestic price inﬂ  ation, and the real interest rate—show 
little quantitative variation with diﬀerent degrees of openness. The sacriﬁ  ce 
ratio—which we measure as the sum of (annualized) output gaps in the 
twenty quarters following the start of the disinﬂ  ation, divided by the change 
in the inﬂ  ation rate of 1 percentage point—is about 1.1 under each calibra-
tion. Aside from the slightly larger initial output decline under the high open-
ness calibration, the main diﬀerences in the responses are compositional. For 
the highly open economy, more of the output contraction is attributable to a 
fall in real net exports; in addition, given the larger share of imported goods 
in the consumption basket, there is a greater disparity between the response 
of consumer price inﬂ  ation and domestic price inﬂ  ation.
The similarity in the responses of output, domestic price inﬂ  ation, 
and the real interest rate is mainly attributable to two factors. First, the 
interest-  sensitivity of aggregate demand only rises modestly as trade open-
ness increases. Although our benchmark calibration imposes a rather high 
long-  run trade price elasticity of 1.5, providing a strong channel (through 
the uncovered interest parity condition) for real interest rates to inﬂ  uence 
exports, private absorption is also quite interest-  sensitive due to the high 
responsiveness of investment. This can be garnered from the bottom panels 
of the ﬁ  gure: the contraction in exports in response to higher real interest rates 
does not markedly exceed the fall in private absorption. This helps to explain 
why output only shows a slightly larger contraction under a 35 percent trade 
share than in the case in which the trade share is only 1 percent of GDP.9 The 
second factor is that desired price markups and real marginal costs do not 
change signiﬁ  cantly with greater openness, so that domestic price inﬂ  ation 
responds very similarly across the diﬀerent calibrations. Overall, these results 
do not indicate a signiﬁ  cant quantitative “steepening” of the Phillips curve 
due to greater openness in response to this particular shock.10
9. Given the presence of adjustment costs on the expenditure components, the interest sen-
sitivity depends on how persistent an eﬀect the shock has on the real interest rate. For shocks 
that exert more persistent eﬀects on real interest rates, exports show a relatively higher interest 
sensitivity than private domestic demand, and the aggregate interest sensitivity of the economy 
rises more substantially with openness. For example, the interest sensitivity rises more with 
greater openness under an alternative model calibration that increases the duration of wage and 
price contracts (since the real interest rate response in that case is more persistent). Similarly, 
the government spending shock following has a more persistent impact on the real interest rate, 
with the implication that the economy becomes more interest sensitive with greater openness.
10. The limited variation in the desired markup reﬂ  ects that the real interest rate shows a fairly 
transient rise; hence, the real exchange rate does not appreciate much. Under an alternative 
model calibration implying a more persistent rise in real interest rates—derived by assuming The Transmission of Domestic Shocks in Open Economies    9 7
Interestingly, historical episodes of disinﬂ  ation in the United States, Can-
ada, and the United Kingdom seem reasonably supportive of the model’s 
implications. Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of inﬂ  ation (measured as the 
longer contract durations—desired markups, and hence, inﬂ  ation show more variation with 
openness.
Fig.  2.2  Disinﬂ  ation episodes in the United States, Canada, and the United 
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annual changes in the GDP deﬂ  ator) and the output gap (as measured by 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD]) 
for the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom for two diﬀerent 
periods of disinﬂ  ation (the early 1980s and early 1990s). As seen in the left 
column of ﬁ  gure 2.2, inﬂ  ation in both the United States and Canada fell 
from roughly 10 percent to 4 percent during the disinﬂ  ations that occurred 
during the early 1980s, while the output gap expanded (in absolute value) 
by roughly 6 to 7 percent in each country. The sacriﬁ  ce ratio in the United 
Kingdom was somewhat lower during that episode, as inﬂ  ation fell by con-
siderably more, while the output gap expanded by a similar amount. In 
the 1990s, the three experiences also were reasonably similar, with Canada 
perhaps having a somewhat higher sacriﬁ  ce ratio than the United States, and 
the United Kingdom a slightly lower sacriﬁ  ce ratio. Thus, while the evidence 
is somewhat noisy, the sacriﬁ  ce ratio does not appear to vary with openness 
in a systematic way.11
Figure 2.3 shows the eﬀects of an increase in government spending.12 
From a qualitative perspective, the government spending hike has similar 
eﬀects on key macroeconomic variables across the alternative calibrations. 
The expansion in aggregate demand initially raises output and real interest 
rates. Some of the output rise is attributable to an increase in potential out-
put, as a negative wealth eﬀect on consumption induces some expansion in 
labor supply. Higher real interest rates and an induced appreciation of the 
real exchange rate eventually cause output to revert toward baseline due to 
a crowding out of private domestic demand and real net exports. Domestic 
inﬂ  ation rises because of a positive output gap, and because the expansion 
in potential output puts additional upward pressure on marginal cost; the 
latter eﬀect reﬂ  ects the interplay of diminishing returns and nominal wage 
rigidity so that the real wage remains above the level that would prevail under 
ﬂ  exible wage adjustment.13
Comparing the alternative calibrations, the magnitude of the output 
response declines with greater openness, though the diﬀerences do not seem 
dramatic given the wide variation in trade shares examined. A highly open 
economy can rely more heavily on a decline in real net exports to alleviate 
pressure on domestic resources. This cushions the wealth eﬀect on labor 
supply in the more open economy, and causes potential output to rise by 
11. Ball (1994) reached similar conclusions based on sacriﬁ  ce ratios for a much larger set 
of episodes. Our approach diﬀers insofar as we compare sacriﬁ  ce ratios across countries over 
similar time periods (rather than pooling all episodes together) as a rough means of controlling 
for diﬀerent levels of monetary policy credibility.
12. Government spending is modelled as an AR(1) process with an autocorrelation coeﬃcient 
equal to 0.97.
13. Thus, even if the monetary rule were aggressive enough to close the output gap, the gap 
between the real wage and ﬂ  exible price real wage would put upward pressure on marginal cost 
and inﬂ  ation. We provide an extensive discussion of the implications of the “real wage gap” for 
marginal cost and inﬂ  ation in section 2.3.7.Fig. 2.3    Increase in government spending in SIGMA (deviation from steady state)100    Christopher Erceg, Christopher Gust, and David López-Salido
less. In addition, the output gap expands by less due to some increase in 
the interest-  sensitivity of aggregate demand with greater openness. The 
responses of domestic price inﬂ  ation exhibit somewhat larger variation with 
trade openness, with the peak inﬂ  ation response only about half as large 
in the highly open economy as in the nearly closed economy. The smaller 
inﬂ  ation response in the highly open economy reﬂ  ects both a smaller output 
gap, and that the smaller expansion in potential output puts less upward 
pressure on marginal costs. In addition, our framework with variable mark-
ups implies that domestic producers desire to reduce their price markup in 
response to heighted competitive pressure from abroad (as the real exchange 
rate appreciates, and, as a result, import prices fall). The restraining eﬀect 
on inﬂ  ation is larger in a more open economy.
The composition of the expenditure response show more pronounced 
variation across calibrations. In a relatively closed economy, falling private 
absorption (especially investment) bears the burden of adjustment, while 
a decline in real net exports is the catalyst for adjustment in a highly open 
economy. Given that the fall in import prices has a larger eﬀect on consumer 
prices when trade openness is high, the responses of consumer price inﬂ  ation 
show more divergence than those of domestic inﬂ  ation.
Figure 2.4 shows a persistent increase in the level of technology.14 The 
eﬀects are qualitatively similar across the three calibrations. In each case, 
output has a hump- shaped response peaking around ﬁ  ve or six quarters after 
the shock, both domestic and consumer price inﬂ  ation fall on impact, and 
the real exchange rate depreciates.
The fall in domestic price inﬂ  ation occurs because the real wage remains 
persistently below the potential real wage, where the potential real wage is 
deﬁ  ned as the real wage that would prevail if prices and wages were com-
pletely ﬂ  exible. Openness tends to mute the decline in domestic price inﬂ  a-
tion through two channels. First, it reduces the magnitude of the rise in 
the potential real wage. This is because the real exchange rate depreciation 
retards the expansion in consumption as the economy becomes more open, 
so that the wealth eﬀect on labor supply is smaller. Second, the deprecia-
tion of the real exchange rate and consequent rise in import prices induce 
domestic producers to raise their markup, as they feel less competition from 
foreign producers. In a more open economy, the pricing decisions of for-
eign exporters becomes relatively more important to the price decisions of 
domestic ﬁ  rms; thus, the rise in import prices plays a more noticeable role 
in moderating the fall in domestic prices.
Finally, there are pronounced diﬀerences in the composition of the output 
response as openness increases, with real exports playing a more prominent 
role, as well as in the degree of divergence between consumer and domestic 
14. The technology shock is an AR(1) process with an autocorrelation coeﬃcient equal to 
0.97.Fig. 2.4    Increase in technology in SIGMA (deviation from steady state)102    Christopher Erceg, Christopher Gust, and David López-Salido
price inﬂ  ation. Notably, given that exchange rate depreciation pushes up import 
prices, consumer prices show less of a decline in the highly open economy.
2.3    The  Workhorse  Model
Our workhorse model builds heavily on the small open economy model 
of Galí and Monacelli (2005), which we extend to a two-  country setting. 
Because these countries may diﬀer in population size but are otherwise iso-
morphic, our exposition focuses on the “home” country. Each country in 
eﬀect produces a single domestic output good, though we adopt a standard 
monopolistically competitive framework to rationalize stickiness in the 
aggregate price level. Households consume both the domestically- produced 
good and an imported good. Household preferences are assumed to be of 
the constant elasticity form, which allows us to analyze the implications of 
home bias, and a price elasticity of import demand diﬀerent from unity. 
Finally, we generalize the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model by incorporating 
nominal wage rigidities.
2.3.1      Households and Wage Setting
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive households indexed 
by h ∈ [0, 1], each of which supplies a diﬀerentiated labor service to an 
intermediate goods-  producing sector (the only producers demanding labor 
services in our framework). It is convenient to assume that a representative 
labor aggregator (or “employment agency”) combines households’ labor 
hours in the same proportions as ﬁ  rms would choose. Thus, the aggregator’s 
demand for each household’s labor is equal to the sum of ﬁ  rms’ demands. 
The aggregate labor index Lt has the Dixit-  Stiglitz form:
(1)  Lt   
1
0
[ζNt(h)]1 (1  w)dh
1  w
,
where  w   0 and Nt(h) is hours worked by each member of household h. 
The parameter ζ is the size of a household of type h. It determines the size 
of the home country’s population, and eﬀectively the share of world output 
produced by the home country in the steady state. The aggregator minimizes 
the cost of producing a given amount of the aggregate labor index, taking 
each household’s wage rate W t(h) as given, and then sells units of the labor 
index to the production sector at their unit cost W t:
(2)  W t   
1
0
 W t(h) 1/ wdh
  w
.
It is natural to interpret W t as the aggregate wage index. The aggrega-
tor’s demand for the labor services of a typical member of household h is 
given byThe Transmission of Domestic Shocks in Open Economies    1 0 3




 (1  w)/ w Lt  
ζ
.
The utility functional of household h is
(4)  t 
j=0
 
∑   j  
 
    1
Ct j(h)(  1)/    
 0  
1    
Nt j(h)1  ,
where Ct(h) and Nt(h) denote each household’s current consumption and 
hours of labor, respectively (which are assumed to be identical across the 
household’s individual members). The intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion in consumption,  , satisﬁ  es     0, and we assume that 0       1,     0, 
and  0   0.
Household h faces a ﬂ  ow budget constraint in period t, which states that 
combined expenditure on goods and on the net accumulation of ﬁ  nancial 
assets must equal its disposable income:
(5)  P CtCt(h)   
s
 ξt,t 1Bt 1(h)   Bt(h)   (1    w)W t(h)Nt(h)   RKtK 
    t(h)   T t(h)
(where variables have been expressed in per capita terms). We assume that 
household h can trade a complete set of contingent claims, with ξt,t 1 denot-
ing the price of an asset that will pay one unit of domestic currency in a 
particular state of nature at date t   1, and Bt 1(h) the quantity of claims 
purchased (for notational simplicity, we have suppressed all of the state 
indexes). Each household purchases the consumption good at a price P Ct, 
and earns (per capita) labor income of (1    W)W t(h)Nt(h), where  W is an 
employment subsidy (designed to allow the ﬂ  exible price equilibrium to 
be eﬃcient). Each household also has a ﬁ  xed stock of capital K, which it 
leases to ﬁ  rms at the rental rate RKt. It receives an aliquot share   t(h) of the 
proﬁ  ts of all ﬁ  rms, and pays lump sum taxes T t(h) to the government. In 
every period t, household h maximizes the utility functional (4) with respect 
to its consumption and holdings of contingent claims subject to its budget 
constraint (5), taking bond prices, the rental price of capital, and the price 
of the consumption bundle as given.
We assume that household wages are determined by Calvo- style staggered 
contracts subject to wage indexation. In particular, with probability 1 –   ξw, 
each household is allowed to reoptimize its wage contract. If a household is 
not allowed to optimize its wage rate, it resets its wage according to W t(h)   
 t– 1W t– 1(h), where  t   W t/  W t– 1. Household h chooses the value of W t(h) to 
maximize its utility functional (4), yielding the following ﬁ  rst-  order condi-
tion:
(6)  t ∑
 
j 0
   jξ j
w
(1    w)
 
(1    w)
 
Λt j  
P Ct j
V wt jW t(h)    0Nt j(h) Nt j(h)   0,104    Christopher Erceg, Christopher Gust, and David López-Salido
where Λt is the marginal value of a unit of consumption, and V wt j   Πj
h 1 
 t h– 1. The employment subsidy  W is chosen to exactly oﬀset the monopo-
listic distortion  W, so that the household’s marginal rate of substitution 
would equal the consumption real wage in the absence of nominal wage 
rigidities.
2.3.2      Firms and Price Setting
Production of Domestic Intermediate Goods
There is a continuum of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods (indexed by i ∈ 
[0, 1]) in the home country, each of which is produced by a single monopo-
listically competitive ﬁ  rm. These diﬀerentiated goods are combined into a 
composite home good, Yt, according to
(7)  Yt   
1
0
 Yt(i)1/(1  p)di
1  p
,
by a representative ﬁ  rm (or “domestic goods aggregator”) that is a perfect 
competitor in both output and input markets. The aggregator’s demand for 
good i is given by:




 (1  p)/   p
Y t,
where P Dt(i) is the price of good i and P Dt is an aggregate price index given 
by P Dt   [1
0P Dt(i)– 1/  p di]–   p.
Intermediate good i is produced by a monopolistically competitive ﬁ  rm, 
whose output Yt(i) is produced according to a Cobb-  Douglas production 
function:
(9)  Yt(i)   Kt(i) (ZtLt(i))1  ,
where     0 and Zt denotes a stationary, country-  speciﬁ  c shock to the level 
of technology. Intermediate goods producers face perfectly competitive fac-
tor markets for hiring capital and labor. Thus, each ﬁ  rm chooses Kt(i) and 
Lt(i), taking as given both the rental price of capital RKt and the aggregate 
wage index Wt. Within a country, both capital and labor are completely 
mobile; thus, the standard static ﬁ  rst- order conditions for cost minimization 
imply that all ﬁ  rms have identical marginal cost per unit of output:
(10)  MCt   
W t  






Similar to household wages, the domestic-  currency prices of ﬁ  rms are 
determined according to Calvo-  style staggered contracts subject to index-
ation. In particular, ﬁ  rm i faces a constant probability, 1 –   ξp, of being able 
to reoptimize its price, P Dt(i). If ﬁ  rm i cannot reoptimize its price in period t, The Transmission of Domestic Shocks in Open Economies    1 0 5
the ﬁ  rm resets its price according to P Dt(i)    t– 1P Dt– 1(i), where  t   P Dt/  P Dt– 1. 
When ﬁ  rm i can reoptimize in period t, the ﬁ  rm maximizes




p t,t j[(1    p)V Dt jP Dt(i)Yt j(i)   MCt jYt j(i)],
taking  t,t j, MCt,  p, V Dt, and its demand schedule as given. Here,  t,t j is the 
stochastic discount factor, V Dt j is deﬁ  ned as V Dt j   Π j
h 1 t h– 1, and  p is a 
production subsidy that is calibrated to make the ﬂ  exible price equilibrium 
eﬃcient.15 The ﬁ  rst-  order condition for setting P Dt(i) is:
(12)  t 
j=0
 
∑  t,t jξ j
p
(1    p)V Dt jP Dt(i)
  
(1    p)
   MCt jYt j(i)   0.
Production of Consumption Goods
Final consumption goods are produced by a perfectly competitive “con-
sumption good distributor.” The representative distributor combines pur-
chases of the domestically-  produced composite good, CDt (obtained from 
the domestic goods distributor), with an imported good, MCt, to produce 
private consumption, Ct, according to a constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) production function:
(13)  Ct   ((1    c) c/(1  c)CDt
1/(1  c)    c
 c/ (1  c)MCt
1/(1  c))1  c,
We assume that the form of this CES aggregator mirrors the preferences of 
households over consumption of domestically produced goods and imports. 
Accordingly, the quasi-  share parameter  c in equation (13) may be inter-
preted as determining household preferences for foreign relative to domestic 
goods. In the steady state,  c is the share of imports in the household’s con-
sumption bundle, so that the import share of the economy is determined as 
the product of  c and the (private) consumption share of GDP.
The distributor sells its ﬁ  nal consumption good to households at price P Ct 
and also purchases the home and foreign composite goods at their respec-
tive prices, P Dt and P Mt. We assume that producers of the composite domes-
tic and foreign goods practice producer currency pricing. Accordingly, P Mt 
  etP∗
Dt, where et is the exchange rate expressed as units of domestic cur-
rency required to purchase one unit of foreign currency and P∗
Dt is the price 
of the foreign composite good in the foreign currency (we use an asterisk 
to denote foreign variables). Proﬁ  t maximization implies that the demand 
schedules for the imported and domestically produced aggregate goods are 
given by:
15. As discussed earlier in the household problem, we deﬁ  ned ξt,t j to be the price in period t 
of a claim that pays one dollar if the speciﬁ  ed state occurs in period t   j. Thus, the correspond-
ing element of  t,t j equals ξt,t j, divided by the probability that the speciﬁ  ed state will occur.106    Christopher Erceg, Christopher Gust, and David López-Salido
(14) MCt    c
P Mt  
P Ct
 (1  c)/ c
Ct and CDt   (1    c)
P Dt  
P Ct
 (1  c)/   c
Ct.
The zero proﬁ  t condition in the distribution sector implies:
(15)  P Ct   ((1    c)PDt
1/(1  c)    cPM
1/(
t
1  c))1  c.
According to equation (15), in an open economy the consumer price level 
depends on both domestic and foreign prices, while if an economy is closed 
to trade (i.e.,  c   0), consumer prices depend only on domestic prices.
2.3.3      Monetary and Fiscal Policy
We assume that the central bank follows an interest rate reaction func-
tion:
(16)  it    t     ( t    t
T)    y(yt   yt
pot),
where the variables have been speciﬁ  ed as the logarithmic deviation from its 
steady-  state value. The nominal interest rate responds to the deviation of 
domestic price inﬂ  ation from the central bank’s exogenous inﬂ  ation target, 
 t
T, and the deviation of output from potential output (ypot), where potential 
output is deﬁ  ned as the economy’s level of output in the absence of sticky 
wages and prices.
As previously noted, openness can give rise to important diﬀerences 
between the domestic price level and the consumer price level. We specify 
a rule that responds to domestic price inﬂ  ation rather than consumer price 
inﬂ  ation in order to minimize diﬀerences between an open and closed econ-
omy that would simply be attributable to the monetary rule, rather than to 
diﬀerences in the underlying structure of the economy.
The government purchases some of the domestically produced good. 
Government purchases, Gt, are assumed to follow an exogenous, stochastic 
process. The government’s budget is balanced every period so that lump 
sum taxes equal government spending plus the subsidy to ﬁ  rms and house-
holds.
2.3.4    Market  Clearing
The home economy’s aggregate resource constraint can be written as:






where the inclusion of the relative population size ζ∗/ζ reﬂ  ects that all vari-
ables are expressed in per capita terms, and M∗
Ct denotes the purchases of 
the domestically produced good by foreign ﬁ  nal consumption producers. 
Market clearing in the labor and capital markets implies:
(18)  K   
1
0
 Kt(i)di and Lt   
1
0
 Lt(i)di.The Transmission of Domestic Shocks in Open Economies    1 0 7
Finally, we assume that the structure of the foreign economy is isomorphic 
to that of the home country.
2.3.5    Benchmark  Calibration
Three key parameters that play a crucial role in inﬂ  uencing our results 
are the price elasticity of demand for traded goods,  c   (1  c)/ c; the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution,  ; and the labor supply elasticity, 
 . While we choose benchmark values of these parameters to be consistent 
with our interpretation of the evidence, it is important to note that there is 
wide range of values for these parameters used in the literature; thus, we also 
consider alternative calibrations.
For the trade price elasticity, we assume that  c   2, which implies  c   
(1  c)/ c   1.5. This estimate is toward the higher end of estimates derived 
using macroeconomic data, which are typically below unity in the short 
run and near unity in the long run (e.g., Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez 
2000). Nevertheless, estimates of this elasticity following a tariﬀ change are 
typically much higher, and we consider higher values in alternative calibra-
tions.16
We choose the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to be an interme-
diate value between estimates derived from two separate literatures. In the 
micro literature, estimates of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, which 
correspond to the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
suggest values in the range of 0.2 to 0.7.17 In contrast, the business cycle 
literature frequently uses log utility over consumption (i.e.,     1) to be 
consistent with balanced growth. We set     0.5 as a compromise between 
these two diﬀerent perspectives.
The parameter   corresponds to the inverse of the (Frisch) wage elasticity 
of labor supply. A vast amount of evidence from microdata suggests labor 
supply elasticities in the range of 0.05 to 0.3, though the real business cycle 
literature tends to use much higher values.18 We set     5 for the benchmark 
calibration, which is at the upper end of estimates from the micro data.
We choose the remaining parameters of the model as follows. Given that 
the model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency, our choice of     0.9925 
implies an annualized real interest rate of 3 percent. The government spend-
ing share of output is set to 18 percent, so gy   0.18. We set the elasticity of 
capital in production function     0.35, and choose  0 so that hours worked 
16. For a discussion of the macro estimates and estimates after trade liberalizations, see 
Ruhl (2005).
17. See, for example, Attanasio and Weber (1995), Attanasio et al. (1999), or Barsky et al. 
(1997).
18. MacCurdy (1981) obtained a point estimate of 0.15 for the Frisch elasticity of labor 
supply for men, a ﬁ  nding largely conﬁ  rmed in the literature (e.g., Altonji [1986], Card [1994], 
and more recently Pencavel [2002]). For an alternative view, see Mulligan (1998). Finally, there 
is more uncertainty regarding the labor supply elasticity for females. For this group, Pencavel 
(1998) obtained a point estimate of 0.21.108    Christopher Erceg, Christopher Gust, and David López-Salido
are normalized to unity in steady state. For the price and wage markup 
parameters, we choose  p    w   0.2, and set the corresponding subsidies to 
equivalent values,  p    w   0.2. We choose ξp and ξw to be consistent with 
four quarter contracts (subject to full indexation). The parameters of the 
monetary policy rule are set in line with the original Taylor (1993) rule, so 
that      0.5 and  y   0.125 (corresponding to 0.5 at an annualized rate). 
Finally, we set the relative population size of the home economy (ζ/ζ∗) to 
1/3. This value implies that the home economy corresponds to 25 percent 
of world output, which is roughly consistent with the U.S. share of world 
output.
2.3.6      The Flexible Price and Wage Equilibrium
It is useful to begin our analysis by investigating the behavior of a log-
 linearized version of the workhorse model under the assumption that wages 
and prices are fully ﬂ  exible. For heuristic reasons, we conduct this analysis 
under the assumption that home country is a small enough fraction of world 
output that any spillovers to the foreign country (in particular, to interest 
rates and domestic demand) can be ignored. Insofar as we have veriﬁ  ed by 
model simulations that spillovers from domestic shocks to the foreign sec-
tor are small even when the home country constitutes 25 percent of world 
output (as in our benchmark calibration), examining the model’s implica-
tions under the assumption of a very small world output share yields con-
siderable insight. Thus, our analysis here closely parallels that of Galí and 
Monacelli (2005), aside from modest diﬀerences arising from our inclusion 
of a government spending shock, and allowing for diminishing returns to 
labor. However, while their paper focused on the formal similarity between 
open and closed economy models, our goal is to explore the quantitative 
diﬀerences that arise as an economy becomes more open, and how these 
diﬀerences depend on underlying structural parameters such as trade price 
elasticities.
We begin by deriving a relationship between output and the domestic real 
interest rate, which Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 
(2002) have characterized as an open economy IS curve. Substituting the 
(log-  linearized) production function for ﬁ  nal consumption goods (13) into 
the resource constraint (17), the latter may be expressed:
(19)  yt   (1   gy)(ct    c(m∗
ct   mct))   gygt,
where small letters denote the deviations of the logarithms of variables from 
their corresponding level, and gy is the government share of output. The 
risk- sharing condition under complete markets can be used to relate private 
consumption to foreign consumption ct∗ and to the terms of trade  t:
(20)  ct   ct∗    (1    c) t   ct∗   εc tThe Transmission of Domestic Shocks in Open Economies    1 0 9
where the parameter εc    (1 –    c) denotes the sensitivity of private con-
sumption to the terms of trade. Using the export and import demand func-
tions, the diﬀerence between real exports and imports m∗
ct –   mct may be 
expressed:
(21)  m∗
ct   mct   (ct∗   ct)   (1   (1    c)) c t   (ct∗   ct)   εnx t.
Thus, real net exports depend on an activity term (rising as foreign consump-
tion expands relative to domestic consumption), and on the terms of trade. 
Because a 1 percent deterioration of the terms of trade raises exports by an 
amount equal to the export price elasticity of demand  c, while causing real 
imports to contract by (1 –    c) c, the overall relative price sensitivity of net 
exports is captured by the composite parameter εnx   (1   (1 –    c)) c.
Substituting these expressions into the resource constraint (19) yields:
(22)  yt   (1   gy)[(1    c)εc    cεnx] t   gygt   (1   gy)ct∗
or simply:
(23)  yt   (1   gy) open t   gygt   (1   gy)ct∗.
The parameter  open   ((1 –   c)εc    cεnx) may be interpreted as either the 
sensitivity of private aggregate demand to the terms of trade, or the (abso-
lute value of) the sensitivity of private aggregate demand to the long-  term 
real rate of interest. The latter follows from the uncovered interest parity 
(UIP) condition:




t j   rt j)   (r∗
Lt   rLt)
where the long- term real interest rate rLt is an inﬁ  nite sum of expected short-
 term real interest rates (rt j). Alternatively, equation (23) can be expressed in 
terms of the current short- term real interest rate to yield an “open economy 
IS curve” of the form:
(25)  yt   tyt 1   (1   gy) open(rt   rt∗)   gy(gt   tgt 1) 
  (1   gy)(ct∗   tc∗
t 1).
Based on the foregoing analysis, the interest sensitivity of private demand 
 open can be regarded as a weighted average of the interest sensitivity of 
consumption εc, and of real net exports εnx, with the interest sensitivity of 
the latter arising from the UIP relation, and depending on the trade price 
elasticity. With some algebraic manipulation,  open can be expressed alterna-
tively as a simple weighted average of the underlying structural parameters 
  (the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption) and  c (the 
price elasticity of both exports and imports):
(26)   open   (1    c)2    (1   (1    c)2) c.110    Christopher Erceg, Christopher Gust, and David López-Salido
The quadratic weight (1 –    c)2 on   reﬂ  ects both that consumption gets an 
eﬀective weight of (1 –     c) in private demand (as seen from equation [22]), 
and that the elasticity of private consumption with respect to the domestic 
real interest rate (εc    (1 –    c)) declines linearly as the share of foreign 
goods rises in the domestic consumption bundle.
Equation (26) provides conﬁ  rmation of the intuitively plausible argu-
ment that the interest-  sensitivity of the economy should rise with openness 
if the trade price elasticity is high relative to the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution in consumption; and conversely, if the trade price elasticity is 
relatively low.19 Formally, the derivative of  open with respect to  c equals 
2(1 –    c)( c –    ), and hence rises if  c    . Thus, even if consumption 
responded very little to the domestic real interest rate—implying a low inter-
est elasticity of output in a closed economy—output could still be highly 
interest sensitive in an open economy if the interest rate changes generated 
large movements in real exports and imports (through their inﬂ  uence on the 
terms of trade).
From a quantitative perspective, the quadratic weights in (26) imply that 
openness can have very substantial implications for the interest sensitivity 
of the economy if there is a signiﬁ  cant divergence between the intertem-
poral elasticity   and the trade price elasticity  c. This is apparent from 
table 2.1, which shows how the interest elasticity of aggregate demand 
 open varies with openness for alternative values of   and  c. For example, 
using a trade share of  c   .35, the weight on   in determining the inter-
est elasticity of private demand is only 0.42 (   [1 –   .35]2). In this case, an 
open economy with     0.5 and  c   1.5 (as in our benchmark calibra-
tion) implies  open   1.1, or more than double the interest sensitivity of 
its closed economy counterpart. With an even higher trade price elasticity 
of 6,  open rises to 3.6, or more than seven times its closed economy coun-
terpart. However, changes in the eﬀective interest sensitivity of aggregate 
output due to openness are almost certainly much smaller than suggested by 
this latter computation, and probably signiﬁ  cantly smaller than implied by 
our workhorse model, which ignores capital. As we show in what follows, 
to the extent that the disparity between the eﬀective interest sensitivity of 
domestic demand and that of real trade narrows in a model with capital ac-
cumulation, the interest sensitivity of the economy shows less variation with 
openness.
We next turn to the determinants of employment, output, and the real 
19. In closely related work, Woodford (2007) examines how the monetary transmission mech-
anism changes with the degree of trade openness in a sticky price model. His model speciﬁ  cation 
imposes a trade price elasticity of unity, and he calibrates the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution     6 to proxy for the high interest rate sensitivity of investment. Accordingly, given 
that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is much higher than the trade price elasticity 
for this choice of parameters, it is clear from equation (26) that an increase in openness lowers 
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wage (which we will refer to as potential employment, potential output, 
and the potential real wage in the model with sticky prices). If prices are 
ﬂ  exible, ﬁ  rms behave identically in setting prices and hiring factor inputs, 
so that there is eﬀectively a single representative ﬁ  rm. The labor demand 
schedule is derived directly from the representative ﬁ  rm’s optimality condi-
tion for choosing its price, which equates the marginal product of labor to 
the product real wage (n.b., the product real wage is expressed in units of 
the domestically produced good). Thus, the (inverse) labor demand schedule 
may be expressed:
(27)  ζt
d   mplt   (1    )zt    lt   (1    )zt    mpllt,
so that the “demand real wage” ζt
d varies inversely with hours worked. The 
parameter  mpl following the second equality is used to denote the absolute 
value of the slope of the labor demand (or marginal product of labor [MPL]) 
schedule, which is simply equal to   in this model. Clearly, both the slope 
of the MPL schedule and the manner in which it is aﬀected by shocks are 
identical to a closed economy.
The labor supply schedule is derived from the household’s optimality 
condition equating its marginal rate of substitution between leisure and 
consumption to the consumption real wage. It is convenient to express labor 
supply in terms of the product real wage, so that:
(28)  ζt




ct    c t,
where mrst should be interpreted as the marginal cost of working in terms of 
the domestically produced good. The terms of trade enters as an additional 
shift variable. A depreciation of the terms of trade shifts the labor supply 
schedule inward, because a given product real wage translates into a smaller 
consumption real wage.
For heuristic purposes, it is useful to derive a labor supply schedule that is 
expressed exclusively in terms of labor (or output) and endogenous shocks, 
as is familiar from the closed economy analogue; that is,
(29)  ζt






1   gy
((1    )(lt   zt)   gygt).
This is easily accomplished by using equation (23) to solve for the terms of 
trade in terms of output, and also the risk-  sharing condition (20) to solve 
for consumption in terms of output. Finally, using the production func-
tion to solve for output in terms of labor, the labor supply function may be 
expressed:
(30)  ζt






1   gy
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or equivalently,
(31)  ζt






1   gy









where the second equation (31) simply deﬁ  nes the parameter  mrs, the slope 
of the labor supply (or MRS) schedule, as  mrs       (1 –    )/[ open(1 –   gy)]. 
It is clear from comparing equation (30) with its closed economy analogue 
(29) that openness can only alter the impact of domestic shocks on the labor 
market through the parameter  open. This parameter can be interpreted as 
determining the wealth eﬀect on labor supply in an open economy, inﬂ  u-
encing both the slope of the labor supply schedule, and how it is aﬀected 
by shocks. Given the dependence of the “primitive” labor supply schedule 
(28) on both consumption and the terms of trade, the wealth eﬀect in (30) 
captures the eﬀects of movements in both variables. From our earlier deriva-
tion of the open economy IS curve,  open rises relative to the intertemporal 
elasticity   if the trade price elasticity  c exceeds  . Intuitively, a relatively 
high degree of substitutibility between home and foreign goods should 
enhance opportunities for international risk- sharing, serving to weaken the 
relationship between consumption and output, and hence the wealth eﬀect 
on labor supply.20
Figure 2.5 illustrates how openness aﬀects labor market equilibrium in 
response to a technology shock through changing both the slope of the labor 
supply schedule and the extent to which it shifts in response to the shock. 
The left panel shows the response in a closed economy, while the right panel 
shows the response in an open economy. The technology shock shifts the 
labor demand schedule up by 1 percent in both the closed and open economy 
(recalling that this schedule is the same in each). In the closed economy, the 
wealth eﬀect on labor supply is determined by the parameter   (in equation 
[29]), which is assumed to be less than unity. Accordingly, the wealth eﬀect 
on labor supply dominates the substitution eﬀect. In the new equilibrium at 
point B, hours worked decline, and the real wage rises. Turning to the open 
economy case, the structural parameters are assumed to imply a value of 
 open in equation (30) that signiﬁ  cantly exceeds unity (as would occur with 
a high value of the trade price elasticity, and high degree of openness). In 
this case, the open economy MRS schedule shifts inward by much less (i.e., 
from A to E) than its closed economy counterpart (from A to D in the left 
panel). In addition to reducing the shift in the schedule, the smaller wealth 
eﬀect implies a ﬂ  atter MRS schedule. Accordingly, with the substitution 
eﬀect dominating the wealth eﬀect, labor hours expand and the real wage 
rises by less than in the closed economy.
20. Moreover, the terms of trade, which act as a shift variable on the primitive labor supply 
schedule, also varies less with domestic output.114    Christopher Erceg, Christopher Gust, and David López-Salido
From a quantitative perspective, openness can exert sizable macroeco-
nomic consequences on the ﬂ  exible wage and price equilibrium under cali-
brations in which openness markedly inﬂ  uences the wealth eﬀect on labor 
supply, and in which the wealth eﬀect plays a prominent role in determin-
ing the slope of the labor supply schedule. Given the open economy labor 
supply schedule (30), this translates into calibrations that give rise to a large 
wedge between  open and   as the trade share increases, and that embed a 
high Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1/  (as the latter accentuates the role 
of the wealth eﬀect in determining the slope of the labor supply schedule 
 mrs). With a very high Frisch elasticity of labor supply and trade price elas-
ticity, wealth eﬀects are attenuated signiﬁ  cantly as trade openness increases 
(as  open rises relative to  ), ﬂ  attening the labor supply schedule and making 
it less responsive to technology and government spending shocks. In the 
limit (as   converges to zero, and  c to inﬁ  nity), the productivity shock has 
no impact on the equilibrium real wage, and a comparatively large impact 
on equilibrium output. The government spending shock has no eﬀect on 
equilibrium output, employment, or the real wage (reﬂ  ecting that it oper-
ates exclusively through a wealth eﬀect, which is eliminated under this cali-
bration). The insulation of output from ﬁ  scal policy is reminiscient of the 
dramatically diﬀerent eﬀects of ﬁ  scal expansion in a closed versus open 
economy that obtain in a traditional Mundell-  Fleming style model.
However, although increased openness can have large eﬀects in principle, 
Fig. 2.5    Rise in technology: Closed vs. open labor market equilibrium under ﬂ  ex-
ible prices and wagesThe Transmission of Domestic Shocks in Open Economies    1 1 5
it has much less dramatic implications for ﬂ  exible-  price employment, out-
put, and the real wage under plausible calibrations. This is apparent from 
tables 2.1 (p. 111) and 2.2 (p. 116), which show how the responses of these key 
variables in the ﬂ  exible price equilibrium vary with openness under a wide 
range of values of the trade price elasticity and the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution in consumption (the superscript “pot” on each variable is 
used to denote “potential” responses, meaning the responses under ﬂ  ex-
ible prices and wages). Table 2.1 shows responses under a Frisch elasticity 
of 0.2, as in our benchmark calibration, while table 2.2 considers a higher 
elasticity of unity. Importantly, for trade price elasticities in the empiri-
cally reasonable neighborhood of 1 to 1.5, and a Frisch elasticity of unity 
or below, diﬀerences between the closed and open economy responses to a 
technology shock are quite small, and only modestly larger in the case of a 
government spending shock.
2.3.7      Sticky Prices and Wages
We next turn to analyzing the model’s behavior in the presence of nominal 
wage and price rigidities. We continue to maintain the assumption that the 
relative share of the home economy in world output is arbitrarily small. 
In this case, the log-  linearized behavioral equations can be expressed in a 
simple form that is essentially identical to that derived in the closed economy 
model of Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), aside from allowing for the 
indexation of wages and prices:
(32)  xt   xt 1⎪t    open(1   gy)(it    t 1⎪t   rt
pot)
(33)    t      t 1⎪t   κp(ζt   mplt)
(34)    t      t 1⎪t   κw(mrst   ζt)
(35)  mplt   ζt
pot    mplxLt   ζt
pot   
 mpl  
(1    )
xt
(36)  mrst   ζt
pot    mrsxLt   ζt
pot   
 mrs  
(1    )
xt
(37)  ζt   ζt 1    t    t,
where xt is the output gap (i.e., yt –   yt
pot), xLt is the employment gap (i.e., 
lt –   lt
pot), rt
pot is the “potential” (or “natural”) rate of interest, ζt
pot the poten-
tial real wage, and the composite parameters are deﬁ  ned by κp   (1 –   ξp)
(1 –   ξp)/ξp, κw   (1 –  ξw)(1 –   ξw)/[ξw(1    )(1    w)/ w],  mrs       (1 –   )/
[ open(1 –  gy)], and  mpl    . The potential level of a variable is deﬁ  ned as the 
value it would assume if prices and wages were fully ﬂ  exible. The model is 
completed with the inclusion of the monetary rule given in equation (16).21
21. Both for expositional simplicity, and because our focus is on domestic shocks, terms 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6The Transmission of Domestic Shocks in Open Economies    1 1 7
Equation (32) parsimoniously expresses the open economy IS curve in 
terms of output and real interest rate gaps. Thus, the output gap depends 
inversely on the deviation of the real interest rate (it –    t 1⎪t) from its poten-
tial rate rt
pot. The price setting equation (33) speciﬁ  es the change in domestic 
price inﬂ  ation to depend on the future expected change in inﬂ  ation and 
real marginal cost, where the latter is the diﬀerence between the real wage 
and marginal product of labor. The wage setting equation (34) speciﬁ  es 
the change in wage inﬂ  ation to depend on the future expected change in 
wage inﬂ  ation and the diﬀerence between the MRS and real wage (both in 
product terms). The equations determining the MPL (35) and MRS (36) 
can be speciﬁ  ed to depend only on the real wage under ﬂ  exible prices ζt
pot, 
and the employment gap (or equivalently, the output gap, since the latter is 
proportional). Finally, equation (37) is an identity for the evolution of the 
product real wage.
The log-  linearized representation given by equations (32) through (37) 
is insightful in helping to assess how openness aﬀects the transmission of 
domestic shocks under a given policy rule, and also the policymaker’s trade-
 o ﬀ frontier under certain commonly speciﬁ  ed loss functions. In particular, 
equations (32) through (37) identify several channels through which open-
ness can aﬀect the economy. It is evident from (32) that openness can inﬂ  u-
ence aggregate demand through aﬀecting both the potential real interest 
rate rt
pot, and the sensitivity of the output gap to a given sized real inter-
est rate change (this sensitivity is determined by  open(1 –   gy)). The interest 
sensitivity of aggregate demand increases with openness if the trade price 
elasticity exceeds the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consump-
tion; conversely, the interest sensitivity decreases if the trade price elasticity 
is relatively low.
It is apparent that openness inﬂ  uences aggregate supply directly through 
aﬀecting the sensitivity of the household’s MRS to the employment gap; 
that is, the parameter  mrs in equation (36). The eﬀects of this slope change 
on price setting are most pronounced in the special case of fully ﬂ  exible 
wages. In this case, equation (36) implies that the real wage can be expressed 
directly in terms of the potential real wage and employment gap; that is, ζt   
ζt
pot    mrsxLt. Substituting for the real wage into the price setting equation 
(33), and for the MPL using (35), yields an “open economy new-  Keynesian 
Phillips curve” similar to that derived by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (aside 
from allowing for indexation):
(38)    t      t 1⎪t   κp(( mpl    mrs)xLt).
Given that  mpl is determined by the capital share—a small number equal 
to 0.35 under our benchmark calibration—the slope of the Phillips curve 
hinges crucially on  mrs. Under the conditions discussed previously in which 
openness markedly aﬀects  mrs, it also exerts substantial eﬀects on the Phil-
lips curve slope. For instance, if openness signiﬁ  cantly reduces  mrs (as occurs 118    Christopher Erceg, Christopher Gust, and David López-Salido
under a high Frisch elasticity and relatively high trade price elasticity) mar-
ginal cost and price inﬂ  ation are much less responsive to the output gap in a 
highly open economy, so that the Phillips curve ﬂ  attens. In the presence of 
nominal wage rigidities, however, the close linkage between the real wage 
and employment gap is severed, with the implication that the MRS slope 
has less of a direct impact on the real wage.
Openness also inﬂ  uences both price and wage setting through altering 
the response of the potential real wage ζt
pot. As discussed following equation 
(30), openness aﬀects ζt
pot through inﬂ  uencing the size of the wealth eﬀect 
on the household’s MRS schedule, as well as through changing the slope of 
the MRS schedule. To see how ζt
pot in turn aﬀects price setting, it is helpful 
to substitute equation (35) into (33) to obtain:
(39)    t      t 1⎪t   κp(ζt   ζt
pot    mplxLt).
Thus, in the presence of sticky nominal wages, price inﬂ  ation depends on the 
wage gap ζt –   ζt
pot in addition to the employment gap xLt. Even a policy that 
closed the employment (or output) gap would imply pressure on inﬂ  ation 
if real wages did not immediately adjust to their potential level, implying 
a policymaker trade-  oﬀ between stabilizing inﬂ  ation and the employment 
gap.
Because the actual real wage adjusts sluggishly, the behavior of the wage 
gap depends critically on how shocks aﬀect the potential real wage. To the 
extent that openness reduces variation in the ζt
pot—as under our benchmark 
calibration—greater openness can be expected to reduce the real wage gap 
associated with a zero employment gap, allowing policymakers to come closer 
to stabilizing both employment and inﬂ  ation. But recalling tables 2.1 and 2.2, 
openness does not exert large quantitative eﬀects on ζt
pot under reasonable 
calibrations: even with the high Frisch elasticity of unity, increased openness 
only has a modest eﬀect in dampening the response of ζt
pot to real shocks.
Notwithstanding that it is helpful for economic interpretation to think 
of openness as operating through several channels that aﬀect both aggre-
gate demand supply, it bears emphasizing that the composite parameter 
 open provides a summary statistic for how the model economy is aﬀected by 
openness. As an implication, diﬀerences between closed and open economy 
responses—including of nominal variables such as inﬂ  ation—can only be 
substantial under conditions that induce a signiﬁ  cant disparity between 
 open and the intertemporal substitution elasticity  . Moreover, while such 
a wedge is clearly a suﬃcient condition for the IS curve (32) to be aﬀected 
by openness, the eﬀects of openness on the AS block still tend to be quite 
small under plausible calibrations of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply 
and trade price elasticity.
These considerations are useful in interpreting how impulse responses 
to the same three shocks previously considered in our SIGMA simulations 
depend on the openness of the economy. Figure 2.6 compares responses to a Fig. 2.6    Increase in inﬂ  ation target in workhorse model (deviation from steady 
state)120    Christopher Erceg, Christopher Gust, and David López-Salido
1 percentage point decline in the inﬂ  ation target under three calibrations of 
openness, ranging from a trade share of 1 percent of GDP under the “nearly 
closed” calibration, to 12 percent under our benchmark, to 35 percent under 
“high openness.”22 As in the SIGMA simulations examined in section 2.2, 
the persistence of the shock is set to 0.995, so that it is nearly a permanent 
shock. It is evident that output contracts by a somewhat larger amount in 
the highly open economy. The larger output contraction occurs because the 
target reduction causes a rise in real interest rates, and the interest sensitivity 
of output rises with greater openness in our benchmark calibration (quan-
titatively, the interest sensitivity  open (1 –   gy) rises from 0.5∗(1 –   .18)   0.41 
under the “nearly closed” calibration to 0.90 in the high openness case). 
Price inﬂ  ation also falls a bit more as openness increases, reﬂ  ecting the larger 
output contraction; however, the low sensitivity of marginal cost to the 
employment gap (i.e.,  mpl in equation [35] is only 0.35) accounts for the small 
quantitative diﬀerences in the responses.23 Overall, given the wide diﬀerences 
in the trade shares, the responses of aggregate output, inﬂ  ation, and the real 
interest rate seem quite unresponsive to openness. The main diﬀerences are 
that exports account for a larger share of the output contraction as openness 
increases (i.e., exports/GDP fall by more), and that consumer price inﬂ  ation 
falls more abruptly in the highly open economy (as the real exchange rate 
appreciation exerts a larger eﬀect given the greater share of imported goods 
in the household consumption bundle).
Figure 2.7 compares the eﬀects of a rise in government spending across 
the three calibrations (as in section 2.2, the persistence of the shock is 0.97). 
The responses of output and inﬂ  ation diverge noticeably with openness, 
with output and inﬂ  ation rising much less under the high openness calibra-
tion. Because the Taylor rule keeps output close to potential (ypot) under 
each calibration, the diﬀerences in the output responses mainly reﬂ  ect that 
the wealth eﬀect on labor supply is smaller in a relatively open economy (as 
noted in our discussion of the ﬂ  exible price equilibrium).24 Given sluggish 
wage adjustment, the smaller output expansion in turn reduces pressure 
on marginal cost in the more open economy. In terms of our discussion of 
(39), the real wage gap ζt –   ζt
pot is smaller and less persistent in a relatively 
22. The simulations are derived in the two-  country version of the model in which the home 
country constitutes 25 percent of world output. However, it makes little diﬀerence to our results 
if the relative size of the home country were set close to zero (even in the high openness case, 
we found that the sensitivity of the simulation results to the relative size of the home economy 
is quite small).
23. Moreover, as suggested by our prior discussion, diﬀerences in the MRS slope due to open-
ness have little inﬂ  uence on the real wage response. Thus, with the potential real wage unaﬀected 
by the shock, the real wage gap in equation (39) behaves similarly irrespective of openness, so 
that marginal cost depends mainly on the response of the employment (or output) gap.
24. The simple dynamics in this model appear to contribute to the success of the standard 
Taylor rule in keeping output close to potential. This is in some contrast to the results in 
SIGMA (discussed in section 2.2), in which the Taylor rule induces a persistent expansion of 
the output gap.Fig. 2.7    Increase in government spending in workhorse model (deviation from 
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open economy (as ζpot falls by less); hence, generating weaker pressure on 
inﬂ  ation. Finally, given both a smaller rise in inﬂ  ation and a higher interest 
elasticity of aggregate demand in the highly open economy, the real interest 
rate rises by noticeably less.
Figure 2.8 compares the eﬀects of a highly persistent rise in technology (as 
in section 2.2, the persistence of the shock is 0.97). The response of output 
is somewhat larger in the highly open calibration, while the response of the 
real wage is smaller. To understand this, recall from our discussion of the 
ﬂ  exible price equilibrium that greater openness (assuming  c     as under 
our benchmark calibration) tends to damp the wealth eﬀect of the shock 
on labor supply. This boosts potential output—and thus accounts for some 
of the larger output increase in the ﬁ  gure in the high openness case—while 
reducing the rise in the ﬂ  exible price real wage. The smaller real wage gap 
(in absolute value) helps account for some of the less pronounced decline in 
inﬂ  ation. In addition, as we discuss in section 2.3.8, some of the disparity 
in the output and inﬂ  ation responses reﬂ  ects that our calibrated Taylor rule 
with ﬁ  xed response coeﬃcients fails to account for the higher interest sensi-
tivity of the economy as openness increases; thus, an alternative policy that 
kept output at potential under each calibration would imply smaller dispari-
ties in the output and inﬂ  ation responses than depicted in the ﬁ  gure.
Overall, the salient message seems to be that even dramatic changes in 
the level of openness exert pretty small eﬀects on the responses, except per-
haps for the case of the government spending shock. The larger diﬀerences 
in the case of the government spending shock are perhaps unsurprising, 
given that this shock operates through a wealth eﬀect, and that openness 
aﬀects aggregate supply by altering the size of the wealth eﬀect. Moreover, 
the SIGMA simulations discussed in section 2.2 indicate that some of the 
disparities in the responses to the ﬁ  scal shock would narrow with the inclu-
sion of endogenous capital and adjustment costs on the expenditure compo-
nents; notably, endogenous capital would reduce the pronounced disparity 
between the interest elasticity of private absorption and of trade ﬂ  ows under 
our benchmark calibration, so that the interest elasticity of demand would 
rise by less as openness increased.
We conclude this section by illustrating a case in which openness exerts 
extremely pronounced eﬀects on the impulse responses of the model. In 
particular, ﬁ  gure 2.9 shows responses to the technology shock under an 
alternative calibration that imposes a very high trade price elasticity of 6, 
and a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of unity. As seen in table 2.2, the 
parameter  open rises from 0.5 under the “nearly closed” calibration to 3.6 
in the high openness case, consistent with roughly a halving of the slope of 
the MRS schedule (from 3.5 to 1.8). Given that the wealth eﬀect on labor 
supply diminishes rapidly with greater openness under this calibration, out-
put exhibits a much more pronounced rise in the highly open economy. The 
smaller rise in the real wage in the highly open economy implies a much Fig. 2.8    Increase in technology in workhorse model (deviation from steady state)Fig. 2.9    Increase in technology in workhorse model (alternative calibration:   6 
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smaller real wage gap (in absolute value), and accounts for why inﬂ  ation falls 
only about half as much on impact as in the closed economy. Accordingly, 
as suggested by the ﬁ  gure, a policymaker concerned about the variability of 
domestic price inﬂ  ation and the output gap would face a markedly improved 
trade- oﬀ locus in the open economy. However, we emphasize that this large 
divergence hinges on a high Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and a fairly 
extreme assumption about the trade price elasticity.
2.3.8    Variance  Trade-  oﬀ Frontiers
A limitation of our preceding analysis that characterized policy as follow-
ing a simple (Taylor- style) interest rate reaction function is that it is diﬃcult 
to disentangle what components of the transmission channel change with 
trade openness. In particular, it is hard to ascertain whether diﬀerences are 
attributable to disparities in the “IS” block of the model; that is, in the 
interest sensitivity of the economy, or in the equations governing aggregate 
supply.
Toward this end, it is useful to follow Taylor (1979) in characterizing the 
variance trade-  oﬀ frontier of the home economy. Accordingly, we assume 
that the monetary policy of the home country is determined by an optimal 
targeting rule that minimizes the following quadratic discounted loss func-
tion:
(40)  t 
j=0
 
∑   j( 2
t j    xx2
t j),
where  x is the relative weight on the output gap. The policymaker is 
assumed to minimize the loss function subject to the log-  linearized behav-
ioral equations of the model, while taking as given that monetary policy 
in the foreign economy continues to follow a Taylor rule.25 As in the closed 
economy setting of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003), 
the optimal policy does not depend on the model’s IS curve in the special 
case in which the home country comprises an inﬁ  nitesimal fraction of world 
output.
The left panel of ﬁ  gure 2.10 shows a policy trade-  oﬀ frontier between 
inﬂ  ation and output gap variability for the case of a technology shock. The 
trade- oﬀ frontier is obtained by minimizing the policymaker’s loss function 
(40) over all possible values of  x subject to the log-  linearized behavioral 
equations.26 For visual clarity, the trade-  oﬀ frontiers are shown only for the 
25. The variance trade- oﬀ frontier is not very sensitive to the relative size of the home country. 
Hence, although we derive our results assuming that the home country constitutes 25 percent 
of world output, the trade- oﬀ frontiers are not markedly diﬀerent in the case in which the home 
country share of world output is close to zero. In the latter case, the policymaker trade-  oﬀ 
frontier can be derived by minimizing the loss function subject to the behavioral equations (32) 
through (37) that apply in the small open economy variant of our model.
26. Note that the vertical axis shows the standard deviation of inﬂ  ation, and the horizontal 
axis the standard deviation of the output gap.126    Christopher Erceg, Christopher Gust, and David López-Salido
alternative calibrations of a highly open economy (in which the trade share 
is 35 percent), and the nearly closed case (with a trade share of 1 percent). 
Under either calibration, the standard deviation of inﬂ  ation declines to zero 
as the policymaker’s weight on the output gap  x declines to zero, while 
the standard deviation of the output gap declines to zero as  x approaches 
inﬁ  nity.
As discussed previously, the presence of wage rigidities gives rise to a 
trade- oﬀ between stabilizing the output gap and inﬂ  ation. However, the 
striking feature of the ﬁ  gure is that the trade- oﬀ frontiers are virtually iden-
tical, notwithstanding very pronounced diﬀerences in trade openness. This 
similarity reﬂ  ects that the only channels through which trade openness can 
inﬂ  uence the trade- oﬀ frontier is by aﬀecting the slope of the MRS schedule 
(recalling the MPL is invariant), or by aﬀecting the potential real wage ζt
pot; 
as noted above, while openness aﬀects the slope of the IS curve and potential 
real interest rate rt
pot, this is inconsequential for a policymaker loss function 
such as (40) that does not explicitly depend on the interest rate. Thus, insofar 
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as it is clear from table 2.1 that the potential real wage and slope of the MRS 
show little variation with openness under our benchmark calibration, it is 
unsurprising that the policy frontiers are nearly identical.
Although the policy trade-  oﬀ frontiers are nearly identical, the right 
panel—which plots how interest rate volatility varies with  x—shows that 
implementation of the policy implies considerably less real interest varia-
tion in the more open economy.27 This simply reﬂ  ects that openness mark-
edly raises the interest sensitivity of the economy, even if not the slope of 
the MRS schedule, and ζt
pot (as seen from table 2.1,  open rises from 0.5 in 
the closed economy case to 1.1 when the trade share is 35 percent). Thus, 
some of the relatively small diﬀerences in the transmission of the technology 
shock shown in ﬁ  gure 2.8 are in fact attributable to the aggregate demand 
block of the model. In particular, an optimal rule that puts a high enough 
weight on output gap stabilization to keep output at potential (i.e., a very 
large  x) implies output and inﬂ  ation responses that are even closer than 
those depicted in ﬁ  gure 2.8.
Figure 2.11 considers how the highly open and closed economy policy 
frontiers shift given changes in key structural parameters that aﬀect the 
slope of the MRS schedule. The upper panel shows that even adopting an 
extremely high value of the trade price elasticity  c of 3 and a fairly high 
Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 0.5 (i.e.,     2), is not suﬃcient to induce 
much of a disparity between the trade-  oﬀ frontiers. Not surprisingly, the 
high trade price elasticity does drive a large wedge in the variability of the 
interest rate response associated with any given policy rule; that is, value 
of  x.
The policy frontiers may show considerably more variation with openness, 
but only under rather extreme calibrations. Thus, the middle panel shows 
that the open economy trade-  oﬀ frontier would move further inside the 
(nearly) closed economy frontier in the case in which both the trade price 
elasticity and Frisch elasticity of labor supply were extremely high ( c   6, 
and the value of   of .05 implies a Frisch elasticity of 20). In this case, the 
wealth eﬀect dominates the behavior of the MRS slope, so that the latter 
ﬂ  attens considerably with openness. Provided that the MPL slopes down-
ward enough, the response of the potential real wage is damped considerably 
as openness increases; and because real wages are sticky, this improves the 
trade- oﬀ locus open to policymakers in the highly open economy. However, 
the manner in which the trade-  oﬀ frontier varies with openness in an envi-
ronment with an extremely ﬂ  at MRS tends to be quite sensitive to the slope 
of the MPL schedule (unlike under our benchmark, in which the frontier is 
much less sensitive to the slope of the MPL). As illustrated by the last panel, 
27. Note that ﬁ  gures 2.10 and 2.11 depict the relative weight on the output gap using an 
exponential scale, so that, for example, the tick label –  5 corresponds to a weight of unity on 
inﬂ  ation, and exp(–  5) on the output gap.Fig.  2.11  Policy  trade-  oﬀ frontier for technology shock alternative calibrationsThe Transmission of Domestic Shocks in Open Economies    1 2 9
the open economy trade-  oﬀ frontier actually lies well outside the closed 
economy frontier if the MPL slope is reduced to 0.05 in absolute value.
2.4    Alternative  Model  Speciﬁ  cations
Our workhorse model made a number of simplifying assumptions to keep 
the analysis tractable. We now investigate the robustness of these conclu-
sions to several extensions of the model, including incomplete asset markets, 
endogenous capital accumulation, imported intermediate goods, and local 
currency pricing. As a prelude, it is useful to observe that in these extensions 
it is not possible to summarize how openness aﬀects both the aggregate 
demand and supply blocks of the model in terms of eﬀects on a single 
composite parameter, as in the workhorse model. Nonetheless, much of 
the intuition garnered from the simple model is helpful for understanding 
the eﬀects of openness in these variants (e.g., openness tends to increase the 
interest sensitivity of aggregate demand if the trade price elasticity is high 
relative to that of domestic demand).28
2.4.1      Incomplete International Financial Markets
Our baseline model assumes that asset markets are complete both domes-
tically and internationally. However, as this is an extreme assumption, we 
now consider an alternative in which households only have access to a non-
state contingent international bond.
Under this alternative, the household’s budget constraint can be expressed 
as:
(41)  P CtCt(h)   
s





   
W t(h)Nt(h)   RKtK     t(h)   T t(h)   BDt(h)   etBFt(h).
where BFt 1(h) denotes the household’s purchases of the foreign bond, P∗
Ft is 
the price of the foreign bond (in foreign currency), and BDt 1(h) denotes state-
 contingent bonds traded among domestic households. We follow Turnovsky 
(1985) and assume there is an intermediation cost,  F(bFt 1), paid by domes-
tic households for purchases of the international bond to ensure that net 
foreign assets are stationary.29 This intermediation cost depends on the ratio 
of economy-  wide holdings of net foreign assets to nominal output (bFt 1):





28. Each of the modiﬁ  cations considered in what follows are examined in isolation (i.e., taking 
the workhorse model as a point of departure, rather than building on previous modiﬁ  cations).
29. This intermediation cost is asymmetric, as foreign households do not face this cost; rather, 
they collect proﬁ  ts on the monopoly rents associated with the intermediation costs.130    Christopher Erceg, Christopher Gust, and David López-Salido
and rises when the home country is a net debtor. We set vF to be very small 
(vF   0.001), which eﬀectively implies that uncovered interest rate parity 
holds in our model.
Given this alternative ﬁ  nancial structure, the risk-  sharing condition (i.e., 
equation [20]) no longer holds and the domestic economy’s level of net for-
eign assets inﬂ  uences model dynamics. To understand how, we begin by con-
sidering the demand side of the model. As in section 2.3, it remains possible 
to derive a (log-  linearized) open economy IS curve of the form:
(43)  yt   tyt 1   (1   gy) open{rt   rt∗}   εbFbFt 1   uISt,
where εbF   (1 –   gy)[ (1 –    c) –    open]vF, and uISt   gy(gt –   tgt 1)   (1 –   gy)
(ct∗ –  tc∗
t 1). This expression for the IS curve is the same as in the workhorse 
model (expression [25]) except that it involves the home country’s net foreign 
asset position due to the presence of the intermediation cost. Since we set 
vF to be very small, εbF is very small and the IS curve is virtually unchanged 
vis- à- vis  the  workhorse  model.
Under incomplete markets, however, the IS curve does not provide a com-
plete description of aggregate demand. Intuitively, the IS curve determines 
how aggregate demand grows through time, but the current level is only 
pinned down by the intertemporal budget constraints of households, which 
at a national level constrains the evolution of net foreign assets. Accordingly, 
the aggregate demand block also includes a (log-  linearized) law of motion 
specifying how net foreign assets bFt 1 evolve given the home country’s net 
savings nst:




bFt   
1
 
1   gy
nst,
where nst is the country’s total income less household and government expen-
ditures (i.e., nst   [ yt –  (1 –  gy)ct –  gygct –  (1 –  gy) c t]). Because consumption 
depends only on output and the terms of trade (given the resource constraint 
and equation for real net exports), net savings can also be expressed simply 
in terms of output and the terms of trade. Finally, the terms of trade are 
determined by a modiﬁ  ed uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition, which 
is the same as in the workhorse model except that it reﬂ  ects the presence of 
the intermediation cost:
(45)   t   t t 1   rt∗   rt   vFbFt 1   (r∗
Lt   rLt)   vFt 
j=0
 
∑ bFt j 1,
where rLt corresponds to the domestic long- term real interest rate (see equa-
tion [24]).
Turning to aggregate supply, the MPL schedule remains unchanged under 
incomplete markets, as discussed in section 2.3. However, the MRS schedule 
is inﬂ  uenced by the country’s ability to borrow and lend, so that changes 
in the home country’s net foreign asset position inﬂ  uence aggregate supply. The Transmission of Domestic Shocks in Open Economies    1 3 1
In particular, the marginal rate of substitution (in product terms) can be 
written as:
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This expression for the marginal rate of substitution is similar to the one 
for the closed economy (i.e., equation [29]), except for the inclusion of the 
last two terms involving net savings and the terms of trade. Clearly, for the 
special case of     1, the terms of trade drops from equation (46) so that 
the only diﬀerence between the closed and open economy expression for 
the marginal rate of substitution involves the term in net savings. This net 
saving term can be regarded as adjusting the wealth eﬀect on labor supply 
in an open relative to a closed economy. An increase in net savings is associ-
ated with a smaller wealth eﬀect on labor supply, lowering the household’s 
marginal rate of substitution, and depressing the potential real wage. By 
contrast, this eﬀect is absent in a closed economy, since nst   0.
The previous discussion suggests that the eﬀects of domestic shocks may 
diverge considerably between a closed and open economy if the IS curve 
slope is sensitive to the degree of trade openness (for the same reasons dis-
cussed in section 2.3), or if the shocks exert large eﬀects on net savings. 
To investigate the quantitative eﬀects of openness under our benchmark 
calibration, the right column of ﬁ  gure 2.12 shows the responses of output, 
domestic inﬂ  ation, and consumption to a persistent rise in technology (the 
AR[1] coeﬃcient equals 0.97) for diﬀerent degrees of trade openness under 
incomplete markets; for point of reference, corresponding results under 
complete markets are shown in the left column. Clearly, under either ﬁ  nan-
cial structure, technology shocks have somewhat larger eﬀects on output and 
smaller eﬀects on inﬂ  ation, as the openness of the economy increases. This 
reﬂ  ects that openness damps the expansion in consumption under either 
ﬁ  nancial market structure: under complete markets, because of insurance 
arrangements, and while under incomplete markets it reﬂ  ects an increase 
in desired saving because current income exceeds permanent income. As 
observed in section 2.3, the smaller implied wealth eﬀect on labor supply 
translates into a larger output response, and mitigates the decline in inﬂ  a-
tion. Nevertheless, the diﬀerences in the responses of output and inﬂ  ation 
appear fairly small given the large changes in openness examined. The mod-
est size of the disparities reﬂ  ects that home and foreign goods are not sub-
stitutable enough in our benchmark calibration to have large eﬀects on the 
MRS schedule (i.e., net savings does not change enough to exert much of an 
eﬀect on the MRS schedule given by equation [46]).
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open and closed economy under incomplete markets, ﬁ  gure 2.13 shows the 
eﬀects of a more transitory technology shock (the AR[1] coeﬃcient equals 
0.8) on output under three alternative calibrations of the trade price elas-
ticity and the Frisch labor supply elasticity. We consider a transitory shock 
because it can potentially drive a larger wedge between current and perma-
nent income, thus amplifying the diﬀerences in the wealth eﬀect between a 
closed and open economy.
The top panel shows the eﬀect on output under a trade price elasticity 
of 6 (keeping the Frisch elasticity at its benchmark value of 0.2, so     5). 
The combination of the more transient shock and greater substitutability 
between home and foreign goods generates a larger increase in net savings 
in the domestic economy; hence, larger output diﬀerences than under the 
benchmark calibration. As shown in the middle and lower panels, these 
diﬀerences in the output responses become even larger as the labor supply 
curve becomes more elastic (i.e., a lower value of  ) and as the trade price 
elasticity increases. However, it bears reiterating that rather extreme calibra-
tions of the trade price elasticity (and a high Frisch elasticity) seem required 
for the responses to show large divergence based on openness.
2.4.2    Endogenous  Investment
We next investigate the robustness of our results to include endogenous 
investment into the workhorse model of section 2.3. In the modiﬁ  ed frame-
work, households augment their stock of capital according to:
(47)  Kt 1(h)   (1    )Kt(h)   It(h),
where It(h) and Kt(h) denote household investment and the beginning of 
period t stock of capital, respectively. The household budget constraint is 
also modiﬁ  ed to reﬂ  ect investment purchases:
(48)  P CtCt(h)   P CtIt(h)   
 
s
 ξt,t 1Bt 1(h)   
W t(h)Nt(h)   RKtKt(h)     t(h)   T t(h)   Bt(h)   P Dt It(h).
In equation (48),  It denotes an adjustment cost given by:
(49)   It(h)   
 I
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Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), it is costly to change 
the level of investment from the previous period. Investment goods are pro-
duced using the same technology as ﬁ  nal consumption goods (see equation 
[13]); hence, they require both the domestically produced composite good 
as well as imports. The import share of investment goods and elasticity of 
substitution between domestic goods and imports in the production func-
tion for investment is assumed to be the same as for consumption.
The inclusion of endogenous investment tends to markedly boost the Fig.  2.13  The  eﬀect on output of a more transitory increase in technology (alterna-
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interest sensitivity of domestic demand under plausible calibrations. Accord-
ingly, as suggested by the SIGMA simulations in section 2.2, the interest 
sensitivity should be expected to rise less steeply with openness compared 
with the workhorse model; in fact, the aggregate interest sensitivity of the 
economy can even decline with greater openness if investment is suﬃciently 
interest sensitive.
To illustrate these points, the upper panel of ﬁ  gure 2.14 reexamines the 
reduction in the inﬂ  ation target shock in the augmented model with invest-
ment. The calibration in the top panel sets the adjustment cost on investment 
parameter  I   0.2, which eﬀectively serves to equalize the interest elastic-
ity of domestic demand and of real net exports (notwithstanding that the 
interest elasticity of consumption is unchanged from our benchmark cali-
bration). In contrast to the model with ﬁ  xed capital (see ﬁ  gure 2.6), which 
implied a modestly larger output contraction in the highly open economy 
relative to the closed economy, the response of both output and inﬂ  ation is 
nearly invariant to trade openness. The virtually identical output responses 
reﬂ  ect that the eﬀective interest sensitivity of domestic demand is very close 
to that of real net exports, so that putting a higher weight on the latter as 
trade openness rises has little eﬀect on the overall interest sensitivity of the 
economy. The similar output responses across the calibrations translate into 
commensurate eﬀects on marginal cost and inﬂ  ation.
The two lower panels consider alternative calibrations, which show that 
the general conditions highlighted in section 2.3 as potentially giving rise 
to large diﬀerences between closed and open economies continue to remain 
operative under endogenous capital accumulation. Thus, the middle panel 
considers the case in which the trade price elasticity is set to 6, rather than 
1.5 as in our benchmark. In this case, the interest sensitivity of real net 
exports is much higher than that of domestic demand, so that the aggregate 
interest sensitivity of the economy rises with openness, and output shows 
a larger contraction as openness increases. The ﬁ  nal panel keeps the trade 
price elasticity at its benchmark value of 1.5, but increases the eﬀective 
interest sensitivity of domestic demand relative to the ﬁ  rst panel by reducing 
the adjustment cost parameter  I to 0.01. In this case, output contracts by 
somewhat more in the closed than in the open economy.
2.4.3    Imported  Materials
Our workhorse model treats imports as ﬁ  nished goods. However, many 
imported goods are used as intermediate inputs in production, and their use 
in production may alter the transmission of domestic shocks.
To investigate this possibility, we follow McCallum and Nelson (1999) and 
modify the production process of intermediate goods producers discussed 
in section 3.3 so that gross output of intermediate good i, Yt(i), is produced 
according to the CES gross production function:Fig. 2.14    Reduction in inﬂ  ation target in endogenous investment modelThe Transmission of Domestic Shocks in Open Economies    1 3 7
(50)  Yt(i)   ((1    L) L/(1  L)(Kt(i) (ZtLt(i))1  )1/(1  L) 
   L
 L/(1  L)MYt(i)1/(1  L))1  L.
Thus, value-  added for good i is produced via a Cobb-  Douglas production 
function and combined with ﬁ  rm i’s purchases of the foreign aggregate good 
MYt(i), which is used as an intermediate input, to produce the gross output 
of good i. The parameter  L determines the share of imported materials 
in gross production, and  L   (1  L)/ L is the elasticity of substitution 
between value- added and imported materials. We assume that capital, labor, 
and imported materials are perfectly mobile across ﬁ  rms within a country so 
that all ﬁ  rms have identical marginal costs per unit of gross output (MCt):
(51)  MCt   ((1    L)MCVt
 1/ L    LPMt
 1/ L)  L,
where MCVt is marginal cost per unit of value- added deﬁ  ned earlier in equa-
tion (10).
The inclusion of intermediate inputs in the model changes the home 
economy’s resource constraint so that:





Ct   M∗
Yt),
where M∗
Yt denote exports of the domestic good used as intermediate inputs. 
Market clearing in the factor market for intermediate inputs implies:




The inclusion of material inputs alters the sensitivity of aggregate demand 
to interest rates. For the special case in which wages are ﬂ  exible and value- 
added is linear in labor (    0), it is possible to summarize how openness 
aﬀects the interest sensitivity of aggregate demand through its eﬀect on a 
single composite parameter. As shown in the appendix, under these condi-
tions the open economy IS curve can be written:
(54)  yt   tyt 1   (1   gy) M
open{rt   rt∗}   uISt,
where uISt is a term reﬂ  ecting the government spending shock and foreign 
shocks. This expression parallels equation (25) in the workhorse model, 
with the composite parameter  M
open playing a role akin to  open; hence, it is 
interpretable as the eﬀective interest sensitivity of aggregate demand. The 
elasticity  M
open can be related to  open according to  M
open    open(1 –    L)    L 
 L/(1 –   gy).30 Thus, interest sensitivity of aggregate demand can be regarded 
as a weighted average of the interest sensitivity of consumption, real net 
exports of ﬁ  nal goods, and intermediate imported inputs.
30. Following the logic of section 2.3, the price elasticity of demand for intermediate goods 
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The price elasticity of demand for intermediate goods,  L, appears to be 
quite low relative to the price elasticity of demand for ﬁ  nal traded goods, 
and is perhaps even lower than the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
in consumption. Thus, using the same calibration as McCallum and Nel-
son (1999) which sets  L   1/3, the interest elasticity of aggregate demand 
 M
open declines under our benchmark calibration as the share of intermediate 
inputs in gross output ( L) rises. However, the quantitative implications are 
quite small, given that imported intermediate inputs appear to constitute 
only a small fraction of gross output for most countries. For example, given 
that the share of U.S. imports accounted for by materials (including oil and 
petroleum products) has averaged just under 25 percent during the past two 
decades (based on national income and product account [NIPA] data), this 
would suggest a value of  L in the range of 0.03. Using our benchmark 
calibration with  open   1.1, and setting  L   1/3 and  L   .03, the implied 
interest elasticity of aggregate demand in the model with imported interme-
diate goods  M
open only declines to 1.08.
The presence of imported materials also aﬀects the pricing decisions of 
intermediate producers by altering their marginal costs. In particular, pro-
ducers set gross output prices in a staggered fashion rather than value- added 
prices, and the ﬁ  rst-  order condition for the price of good i is:
(55)  t 
j=0
 
∑  t,t jξj
p
(1    p)V Dt jP Dt(i)
  
(1    p)
   MCGt jYt j(i)   0,
where P Dt(i) now has an interpretation as a gross output price and V Dt j   
Π j
h 1 t h– 1. Equation (55) can be log-  linearized and rewritten as:
(56)   t    t 1    ( t 1⎪t    t)   κp[(1    L)(ζt   mplt)    L t].
where mplt   (1 –   )zt –   Lt corresponds to the marginal product of labor—
in terms of value-  added—described in section 2.3. The marginal cost term 
clearly depends on ﬂ  uctuations in the terms of trade, although this inﬂ  u-
ence depends on the share parameter  L, and hence, almost surely has small 
eﬀects on marginal cost for most countries.
Figure 2.15 compares the eﬀects of a technology shock in the workhorse 
model to that in the model with imported imports for diﬀerent degrees of 
openness. In each case, we set  L   1/3, and calibrated  c and  L so that 
material imports account for roughly 25 percent of total imports in each 
economy.31 As in the workhorse model, the highly open economy experi-
ences a larger increase in output and smaller decline in inﬂ  ation. The inclu-
sion of intermediate inputs tends to dampen the fall in inﬂ  ation in response 
31. In the model with material imports, we vary both  c and  L to alter the ratio of imports 
to GDP in each scenario. As a result, the more open economy is characterized by larger values 
of both  c and  L; however, the fraction of material imports to overall imports is held ﬁ  xed at 
25 percent in all cases. Finally, the simulations shown in ﬁ  gure 2.15 restrict     0, but otherwise 
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to the technology shock, reﬂ  ecting that the fall in unit labor costs is oﬀset to a 
greater degree by higher import prices. However, the diﬀerences between the 
highly open economy and the closed economy do not appear large, so that 
the inclusion of intermediate goods only modestly ampliﬁ  es the diﬀerences 
evident in the workhorse model.
2.4.4    Pricing  to  Market
Our workhorse model assumed that the law of one price holds for each 
intermediate good. However, there is considerable empirical evidence sug-
gesting that the law of one price does not hold. A related literature empha-
sizes that U.S. import prices at the point of entry respond less than one for 
one with a change in the exchange rate (i.e., exchange rate pass-  through to 
U.S. import prices is incomplete).32 We now consider an alternative version 
of our model that can account for these ﬁ  ndings.
In this alternative version, intermediate goods ﬁ  rms set diﬀerent prices 
at home and abroad or “price to market.” This pricing-  to-  market behavior 
arises for two reasons. First, we assume, as in Betts and Devereux (1996), 
that intermediate goods’ prices are sticky in local currency terms. We also 
posit aggregators for intermediate goods that have nonconstant elasticities 
of demand as in Kimball (1995), implying that a ﬁ  rm may face diﬀerent 
demand elasticities at home and abroad.33
To incorporate these features, we modify the problem of the consumption 
goods distributor in the workhorse model by replacing the CES production 
function in equation (13) with an alternative demand aggregator discussed 
in Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson (2006). The implied demand functions of 
the consumption goods distributor for the imported and domestic good i 
are given by:
(57)  MCt(i)    c
1
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1    (Ct   Gt),
(58)  CDt(i)   (1    c)
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1    (Ct   Gt).
As in Dotsey and King (2005), when     0 these demand curves have a linear 
term, which implies that the elasticity of demand of producer i depends on 
its price P Dt(i) relative to an index of the prices of its competitors (see the 
following). When     0, the demand elasticity is constant and 1/(1 –    ) has 
the interpretation as the elasticity of substitution between home brands 
32. For a survey of this literature, see Goldberg and Knetter (1997), and for more recent 
empirical evidence for the United States, see Marazzi, Sheets, and Vigfusson (2005).
33. See Bergin and Feenstra (2001) for a discussion of how the interaction of demand curves 
with nonconstant elasticities with sticky prices can be helpful in accounting for exchange rate 
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(i.e., (1 –    )/  is equivalent to  P in the workhorse model). Price indexes of 
domestic and imported goods are PMt and PDt, given by:
(59)  P Dt   
1
0
 P Dt(i) /(  1)di
(  1)/ 
 and P Mt   
1
0
 P Mt(i) /(  1)di
(  1)/ 
,
while P Ft is a price index consisting of all the prices of a ﬁ  rm’s competitors:
(60)  P Ft   [(1    c)PDt
 /(   )    cPMt
 /(   )](   )/ .
Intermediate goods producers sell their products to the consumption 
goods distributors and can charge diﬀerent prices at home and abroad. 
These prices are determined according to Calvo-  style contracts subject to 
indexation. The ﬁ  rst-  order condition associated with the optimal setting of 




∑  t,t jξj
p1   1   
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(1    P)V Dt jP Dt(i)εDt j(i)V Dt jCDt j   0,
where the elasticity of demand for good i in the domestic market is:
(62)  εDt(i)   
1
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.
With     0, as in Kimball (1995), εDt(i) may be an increasing function of a 
ﬁ  rm’s price relative to its competitors, and a ﬁ  rm will not want its desired 
price (i.e., its optimal price in the absence of price rigidities) to deviate too 
far from its competitors.
Equation (61) can be log-  linearized and expressed as:
(63)   t    t 1    ( t 1⎪t    t)   κp [ζt   mplt      C c(pMt   pDt)],
where     1/(εD –   1) denotes the steady-  state (net) markup over marginal 
cost, εD   1/[(1 –    )(1 –    )] is the steady-  state value of εDt(i), and  c    /
[(  –    )(1 –    )]   0 denotes (the absolute value of the) aggregate elasticity 
between home and foreign goods in steady state. The parameter     1/(1 
   (1    ))   1 reﬂ  ects the degree of “strategic” complementarity in price 
setting (e.g., Woodford 2003). That is, with     0, a ﬁ  rm’s demand elasticity 
is constant, and this expression is the same as in the workhorse model. With 
    0, there are variations in desired markups associated with changes in a 
ﬁ  rm’s price relative to its competitors. In this case, inﬂ  ation is less sensitive to 
marginal cost, and depends directly on import prices given that the compos-
ite coeﬃcient    C C in equation (63) is positive. Clearly, the importance of 
import prices in aﬀecting domestic inﬂ  ation depends directly on the degree 
of openness,  C.
According to equation (63), foreign competition can inﬂ  uence domestic 
inﬂ  ation through changes in desired markups. This expression is reminiscent 
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could inﬂ  uence the desired markups of domestic ﬁ  rms and eﬀectively change 
the slope of the Phillips curve. In particular, they argued that monetary 
shocks were likely to cause domestic prices in an open economy to respond 
more quickly, which they interpreted as a steepening of the slope of the Phil-
lips curve. From a qualitative perspective, monetary policy shocks can also 
steepen the Phillips curve in our model with variable markups. In particular, 
a monetary contraction occurring in response to a decrease in the central 
bank’s inﬂ  ation target lowers marginal cost and generates a real appreciation 
of the domestic currency. This appreciation lowers import prices relative to 
domestic prices, and domestic producers respond by reducing their desired 
markups. As a result, domestic price inﬂ  ation can appear more sensitive to 
the fall in demand associated with the monetary contraction.
However, we emphasize that the source of the shock in our framework 
has crucial bearing for the question of whether inﬂ  ation becomes more or 
less sensitive to aggregate demand. For example, in response to a govern-
ment spending shock, inﬂ  ation can appear less sensitive to demand. Higher 
government spending puts upward pressure on marginal cost, but the real 
exchange rate appreciates. This appreciation reduces relative import prices, 
forcing domestic producers to lower their desired markups. This reduction 
in desired markups has the eﬀect of making domestic price inﬂ  ation less 
sensitive to the increase in aggregate demand.
A domestic ﬁ  rm also sets a sticky price in the local currency of the for-
eign economy. These prices are also determined according to Calvo-  style 
contracts indexed to lagged foreign import price inﬂ  ation, with the log- 
linearized ﬁ  rst- order condition associated with domestic producer i’s choice 
of a price to set in the foreign market given by:
(64)   ∗
Mt    ∗
Mt 1    ( ∗
Mt 1⎪t    ∗
Mt)   κp [(ζt   mplt   qDt)
    (1    ∗
C) c(P∗
Mt   P∗
Dt)],
where qDt   p∗
Dt   et –  pDt is the real exchange rate in terms of domestic prices. 
This equation implies that foreign import prices (i.e., domestic export prices 
in units of the foreign currency) do not respond fully to changes in domestic 
marginal cost, or to changes in real exchange rates. In turn, the response of 
real trade ﬂ  ows is also muted. In contrast, in the workhorse model, changes 
in exchange rates have a relatively large eﬀect on import prices and thus on 
real trade ﬂ  ows.
Figure 2.16 shows the eﬀects of a technology shock for diﬀerent degrees of 
openness in both the workhorse model with a constant elasticity of demand 
and the model with variable desired markups and pricing to market. For the 
model with variable desired markups, we set     3,   such that the aggregate 
trade price elasticity  c equals its benchmark value of 1.5, and   so that the 
steady-  state markup is 20 percent. Under our benchmark calibration, the 
variation in desired markups mutes the responsiveness of import and export Fig. 2.16    Increase in technology: Workhorse model vs. variable desired markups 
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prices to exchange rate changes and reduces the interest sensitivity of real 
trade ﬂ  ows.
Output responds more to the technology shock under calibrations with a 
high degree of trade openness in both the workhorse model and the model 
with variable markups. In particular, higher openness damps the wealth 
eﬀect on labor supply, which causes potential output to respond more as 
openness rises.
The responses of inﬂ  ation are uniformly smaller in the variable desired 
markups model than in the workhorse model for any level of openness, 
which mainly reﬂ  ects that the former allows for strategic complementarity 
in price setting; this feature damps the response of inﬂ  ation to real marginal 
cost. However, notwithstanding the smaller size of inﬂ  ation responses in the 
variable desired markups model, there is noticeably greater variation with 
level of openness that is attributable to diﬀerent incentives facing domestic 
price setters as openness changes in the variable markups framework. In 
particular, given that import prices rise as the home real exchange rate depre-
ciates, domestic ﬁ  rms have an incentive to raise their markups in response to 
weaker competition from imports, thus mitigating the fall in domestic price 
inﬂ  ation. This eﬀect is clearly more important in a highly open economy 
than in a relatively closed economy, which accounts for the signiﬁ  cant damp-
ening in the inﬂ  ation response as openness rises.
These considerations suggest that openness may have greater conse-
quences for price setting than implied by the simple workhorse model. Even 
so, some of the spread between the inﬂ  ation responses would be reduced in a 
richer dynamic model that allowed for trade adjustment costs, as this feature 
tends to retard variation in the desired markup. This helps account for why 
the inﬂ  ation responses from the SIGMA model shown in ﬁ  gure 2.4 show 
noticeably less variation with openness than the responses in ﬁ  gure 2.16.
2.5    Conclusion
In this chapter, we have used an open economy DSGE modeling frame-
work to explore how trade openness inﬂ  uences the transmission of domestic 
shocks. Our analysis focused on how openness can potentially aﬀect trans-
mission through changing the interest sensitivity of aggregate demand, and 
through inﬂ  uencing the supply block by aﬀecting marginal costs and desired 
markups.
Perhaps surprisingly—and in contrast to some claims advanced in the 
ongoing debate about the eﬀects of globalization—our results do not sug-
gest much sensitivity of either aggregate demand or supply to trade openness. 
Based on our analysis, it still seems plausible that there may be noticeable 
diﬀerences between the response of a highly open economy, such as Canada, 
and a relatively closed economy, such as the United States, to certain domes-
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fall less in response to a favorable supply shock in Canada than in the United 
States if the shock also makes imports less competitive due to exchange rate 
depreciation. However, it seems less plausible that the gradual rise in trade 
openness that has occurred in most industrial countries during the past few 
decades has had much inﬂ  uence on how domestic shocks, including mon-
etary or ﬁ  scal policy changes, aﬀect the economy.
As a corollary, it seems doubtful that globalization, interpreted narrowly 
as enhanced trade linkages, played much of a role in contributing to the 
“Great Moderation” by aﬀecting the transmission channel of domestic 
shocks. Of course, this leaves open the possibility that some of the improved 
inﬂ  ation and output performance experienced by a wide array of countries 
in the past two decades may be attributable to the combination of increased 
trade openness—which surely increases sensitivity to external shocks—and a 
generally favorable array of international shocks for much of that period.
In interpreting our results, it is important to caution that we have con-
ditioned on a monetary rule that only responds to domestic price inﬂ  ation 
(and the output gap) in order to focus on how openness aﬀects transmission 
through the aggregate demand and supply blocks of the economy. Open-
ness can potentially exert somewhat larger eﬀects on the transmission of 
domestic shocks in the realistic case in which the monetary rule responds 
to consumer price inﬂ  ation rather than domestic inﬂ  ation. However, it is 
important to stress that to the extent that many models—including the work-
horse model—impose complete pass-  through of exchange rate changes to 
import prices, they probably exaggerate how openness aﬀects transmission 
through the monetary policy rule. The diﬀerence between consumer price 
inﬂ  ation and domestic price inﬂ  ation does not vary as markedly with open-
ness in models with variable desired markups such as SIGMA.
In this analysis, we have deﬁ  ned openness fairly narrowly as trade open-
ness, and abstracted from the potential implications of the rapid increase 
in the size of cross border ﬁ  nancial claims that have generally accompa-
nied enhanced trade ties. It is quite plausible that changes in ﬁ  nancial link-
ages could play a signiﬁ  cantly larger role in inﬂ  uencing the transmission 
of domestic shocks than suggested by our analysis. This would seem an 
interesting extension for future research.
Appendix
This appendix describes how the presence of imported materials aﬀect the 
overall elasticity of demand with respect to the real interest rate.
Proceeding as in section 2.3, simple algebraic manipulations allow us 
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domestic and foreign shocks. A log-  linear approximation to the aggregate 
resource constraint can be written as follows:
yDt   (1    L)(1   gy){(1    c)cDt    cm∗
Ct}    Lm∗
Yt   (1    L)gygt.
Following the steps used in section 2.3, the term in brackets {(1 –   c)cDt   
 cm∗
Ct} can be written in terms of foreign consumption and terms of trade 
(i.e., ( open t –   c∗
Dt)(1 –   gy)(1 –    L)). The task, then, is to ﬁ  nd an expression 
that relates m∗
Yt to foreign variables and the terms of trade. Import demand 
of materials in the foreign economy is given by∗.
m∗
Yt   y∗
Dt   (1    ∗
L)(1    c ∗) L[ξt ∗   zt∗    t].
Assuming that wages are ﬂ  exible, we can use the MRS in the foreign 
economy to express the foreign product real wage in terms of foreign vari-
ables and the terms of trade. Thus, domestic demand can be written in a 
more compact way as follows:
yDt   ( open t   c∗
Dt)(1   gy)(1    L)    L(1    ∗
L)(1    c ∗) L t 
  (1    L)gygt    L ft∗,
where ft∗ represents a combination of foreign variables. Relative to the 
benchmark model, the previous expression makes clear that ﬂ  uctuations in 
imported materials introduce an additional eﬀect of the terms of trade on 
domestic output, whose intensity depends upon the share of imported mate-
rials on gross production ( L), the share of imports of the foreign economy 
( c ∗), and the elasticity of substitution of materials ( L) and value- added in 
gross production. The previous expression can be rearranged as follows:
yDt   ( M
open  t   (1    L)c∗
Dt)(1   gy)   (1    L)gygt    L ft∗,
where  M
open is given by:
 M
open    open(1    L)    L
(1    ∗
L)(1    c ∗) L    
(1   gy)
.
Assuming that the home economy is suﬃciently small, we can rewrite this 
expression as:
 M
open    open(1    L)    L
 L  
(1   gy)
.
If  L   0, this expression is the same as the one for the workhorse model.
∗For convenience, we assume that the value-  added function is linear in 
labor (    0).The Transmission of Domestic Shocks in Open Economies    1 4 7
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